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The paper provides a model that assesses the set of complementary components of varying 
compatibility and its effect towards consumer adoption decisions.  The smartphone market is 
a system good which utilizes the device and a set of compatible applications (apps).  The 
amount of switching costs may vary depending upon the consumer’s decision to switch 
devices or across platforms.  Analyzing the Android ecosystem, the process of custom ROMs 
(and rooting) and the large set of games, news, etc. apps justify the existence of device-
specific and platform-specific apps.  The model reinforces the findings of a survey conducted 
by UBS suggesting the retention rate (i.e. level of switch costs) of Apple users is higher than 
Android users.  The retention among Android devices is much lower in comparison as well.  
The model observes that the product fragmentation and the interdependence of apps lead to 
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Recent years have observed rapidly growing market share of smartphones in the 
mobile phone market in the United States, from 13.6% in July 2009 to 40% in July 2011 
(comScore Data Mine, 2012).  The recent growth has also changed the market structure 
through various strategies that platform providers have adopted.  Currently, the U.S. 
smartphone market is dominated by three main operating system (OS) platforms: Apple iOS, 
Google Android and Blackberry OS.  As of July 2011, figure 1 illustrates the market shares 
of Android, Apple and Blackberry are 40%, 28% and 19%, respectively (Nielsen). The 
market share of Blackberry has decreased from 35% in June 2010 to 19.2% within 6 months 
and continues to slip (Distimo, 2010). 
The increasing role of smartphones and their potential market size in has led to the 
explosion of the complementary market for mobile applications.  The term “applications” (or 
“apps”) is broadly defined as a set of software programs which can carry out particular tasks 
for the end users (Harris, 2003).  Examples of applications include word processor programs, 
games, virus scanners, etc.  In the context of mobile platforms, mobile apps can be defined as 
the programs designed to be compatible with a specific operating system (OS) with an 
associated device such as a smartphone, tablet computer and/or portable media player.  The 
strict definition of apps often excludes ebooks and media products (such as movies and 
music) that are available on the various app stores (PCMag – Digital Content Definition, 
2012).  As of November 2011, the app market consisted of four major storefronts: Apple App 
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Store (with 510,412 apps), Android Market
1
 (330,845), BlackBerry App World (50,015) and 
Windows Marketplace (40,000).  The two storefronts Apple App Store and Android Market 
take account of more than 90 percent of all apps, which is consistent with the market share of 
their compatible smartphones.   
The structure of the mobile ecosystem consists of various players who make a 
decision around a specific platform.  The platform – the operating system - is the 
intermediary market that brings together the various players: consumers, app developers and 
hardware producers.  App developers are usually third-party groups which develop apps 
targeted for a specific platform. The platform providers benefit from having a large portfolio 
of app contents and app developers want to have a larger network of users to increase their 
revenue.  This structure of apps and platforms fit into the traditional definition of a two-sided 
market.   
Hardware producers produce smartphones for a specific platform. However, the 
provision of hardware products varies by the platforms in the United States. Apple hardware 
products (e.g. iPods, iPhones, iPads) are exclusively produced by Apple itself. On the other 
hand, hardware products for Android platform are produced by third parties (e.g. Samsung, 
HTC, Motorola, etc). 
Consumers adopt a hardware product of a specific platform, mainly based on the 
quantity and quality of available apps for the platform.  This construct of a two-sided market 
is slightly different from traditional cases. In the system market of video game consoles or 
                                                     
1
 As of March 6, 2012, the Android Market has consolidated with Google Music and Google eBookstore under 
the name Google Play.  Like the Android Market, Google Play is still the hub in which consumers obtain apps 
and does not change the observations discussed. 
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printer/cartridges, consumer receives utility only in the combination of the system goods; for 
example, a printer or cartridge alone does not provide utility.  In the smartphone market, on 
the other hand, consumers receive utility from each component (hardware device and 
apps/accessary), though its combination enhances the utility.  Consumers initially make a 
purchasing decision of hardware device and then buy various types of apps afterwards. This 
implies that the adoption decision of hardware affects the switching costs to an alternative 
platform in the future and the degree of locked-in to a specific platform.  However, since the 
need of each consumer is different, users in the market possess different levels of switching 
costs that need not be prohibitive. 
The decision of a consumer can be modeled as a two-step process. In the first period, 
a consumer decides the adoption of a particular hardware (or platform) and the number of 
complementary products (apps). In the second period, he can switch to another hardware 
(and apps) or keep the existing hardware and buy more apps. Assuming the consumer 
chooses a particular hardware, his decision in the first period is how much to invest (or 
purchase) in the complementary products.  If he purchases many apps in the first period, the 
switching costs to another platform in the second period would increase due to 
incompatibility of apps between different platforms.  
The objective of this thesis is to analyze the amount of investment for two types of 
components, device-specific components and platform-specific components.  That is, there 
will be components that are only compatible with their current device and components that 
will be compatible across the platform respectively.  For instance, most Android apps are 
compatible to any Android compliance device; however, the apps will not be compatible on 
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an Apple device creating platform-specific components.  Similarly, manufacturers produce 
apps/accessories that are only compatible with their own brand or devices.  More apparent on 
Android, devices can be personalized with different themes and modified operating systems 
which require specific instructions in order to unlock such potential.  These instructions vary 
across devices as manufacturers perform different changes upon their base OS leading to 
device-specific components.  Depending on the consumer’s subsequent adoption decision, 
results can differ from the varying levels of compatibility.  In a broad sense, the optimal 
decision is to maximize utility from the entire component set subject to his preferred 
allocation between the components and the actual utility yields. 
This research can to shed some insight on the significant differences in consumer 
loyalty and retention rates between the Apple and Android platform.  Many surveys of 
smartphone users show that there are more users who suggest they would switch away from 
Android than Apple.  UBS conducted a survey in 2011 suggesting the retention rates of 
Apple and Android users are 89% and 55% respectively.  Furthermore, the retention rates 
among Android manufacturers are even lower (39% for Samsung and 28% for HTC).  There 
may be other factors which lead to this wide range of retention rates but the paper will 
explore the area of complementing components and product introductions on the Android 
platform (Hughes – Apple Insider, 2011). 
This thesis is organized as follows.  The next section presents in-depth details of the 
entire smartphone ecosystem and the motivation behind the study.  Section 3 presents the 
related literature and provides an understanding of how this paper differs from the previous 
research.  Section 4 describes the details of the models and the derivation of the equilibrium 
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states for the consumer.  Observations will be discussed in a one-period model, a two-period 
model with perfect information and a two-period model with uncertainty.  Section 5 
concludes the analysis with application in the current smartphone ecosystem and discusses 
the future of this research.  Details on the model formulation and explanation of the demand 




Motivation and Evidence 
2.1 Evolution of the Smartphone Ecosystem 
The smartphone market is an ecosystem with various components.  The general 
construct of this market possess a device/smartphone, an operating system (OS) and a set of 
applications (apps) housed within an online storefront.  To understand the current state of the 
mobile platform ecosystem, several areas needs to be explored which help solidify the three 
components in the market.  The emergence of apps for mobile devices comes from the 
convergence and evolution of several technologies. The most critical developments that 
paved the way for apps are the original platform of cellphones. The original cellphone was 
introduced in the early 1980’s whose primary function was the added mobility of a 
conventional telephone such as the Motorola DynaTAX 8000X.  As the product began to 
mature, the device became smaller, stronger and encompassed more functionality such as 
texting, photo taking, music playing and other personalizations (Webdesigner Depot, 2011).   
As the evolution continued, the cellphone platform naturally enveloped the personal 
digital assistant (PDA) market.  A PDA is a handheld device mainly used as a personal 
information management (PIM) system where users can store contacts, notes and 
appointments (PCMag – PDA Definition, 2012).  These newer cellphones that encompassed 
the functions of a PDA were coined as smartphones (versus conventional phones defined as 
feature phones or ‘dumb’ phones).  An agreed upon definition of smartphone (and feature 
phones) does not yet exist; however, the main characteristics of a smartphone includes 
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functions of a PIM system, mobile connectivity, voice calling and a platform conducive to 
support third party applications (PCMag – Smartphone Definition, 2012). 
Most feature phones contain the same functionality, but the main difference from 
smartphones is their lack of a platform that runs third party applications.  Many of the feature 
phones contain a proprietary platform with static features/functions.  That is, the feature 
phone had a fixed set of software and it was not conducive to install/upgrade new apps.  In 
the late 90’s, RIM produced a line of pagers which allowed for wireless internet, enterprise 
email and various organizer utilities. The first BlackBerry device provided a product that 
allowed for mobile productivity by including features such as a physical keyboard, 
organizers, web access among other things (BerryReview, 2009). The new devices set a 
catalyst to bring evolution to the cellphone and smartphone market. It is not until the 
introduction of downloadable/installable applications were these devices considered 
smartphones. 
Concurrent with the evolution of smartphones, there have been many developments in 
the online shopping landscape. With the introduction of the internet in 1990, various new 
applications were developed in order to utilize the connectivity. Netscape introduced a 
browser in 1994 which enabled secure online transactions, and Amazon and eBay were 
established in 1995 to capitalize the online transactions. In 1999, Napster software allowed 
users to transfer peer-to-peer files, which helped online industry to secure profits 
(InstantShift, 2010).   
In October 2001, Apple introduced a hard-drive based mobile music player called the 
iPod, and also launched iTunes which allowed users to purchase music, television shows, 
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movies, books, etc. (Ipod History, 2011). In July 2008, Apple introduced the App Store, a 
few months prior to the introduction of their new iPhone with the compatible operating 
system (OS) – iOS.  On the first day of the establishment of the Apple app store on July 11, 
2008, the store contained 500 apps with approximately 25% portion of free apps (Distimo, 
2012).  Analysts suggested that the establishment of the app store was a strategic move by 
Apple to fill a niche in the market and to differentiate itself from their rivals in the market at 
the time, Palm Treos and BlackBerry products (Blue Ocean Strategy, 2012).  These products 
established at the time, however, were static in their features since there was no market for 
installable applications.   
Lastly, the growing proliferation in social media, connectivity and advancement in 
information technology is adding to the popularity and demand for apps.  Mobile devices 
have become a platform for dynamic context as opposed to the static, pre-installed content.  
This development has seen large social media companies such as Facebook, Twitter 
developing apps on the various platforms (VisionMobile – Clash of Ecosystems, 2011).  
Recently, large banks have also begun developing apps so their clients are able to keep 
connected with their finances.  The continuing evolution of the mobile device platform fuels 
the continued interests for developers to create new and novel apps.  Compared to the 
original products, developers are now able to exploit new features such as cameras, lights, 
touchscreens and GPS features.  
With the convergence of these technologies and the solidification of the mobile 
platform industry, Google also became interested in the market.  By expanding into this 
mobile platform, Google intended to increase their installed base for their ad-based revenue 
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business model.  In 2005, Google purchased Android Inc. which developed the Android 
platform.  In order to build an ecosystem that could rival that of the Apple infrastructure (i.e. 
mature platform, product line and online storefront), Google established the Open Handset 
Alliance (OHA) which consisted of mobile device manufacturers, software developers and 
mobile operators.  To support this partnership among the various agents, the source code for 
the Android platform was available to all members.  With the source code open to all 
members and app developers, the Android Market Place contains more variety than Apple 
(VisionMobile – Open Governance Index, 2011).  Android apps do not face an approval 
process and allows for apps designed to interact directly with the Android OS.  The source 
code of the Apple iOS is closed and they maintain an approval process which limits the 
variety of apps compatible with their OS (Appcelerator, 2011, 2012). 
In order to keep pace with the rising popularity of apps and the smartphone market, 
BlackBerry and Microsoft both established their app stores in 2009.  However, both markets 
have not seen as high growth as compared to their Apple and Android counterparts. 
Comparing the two main platforms, two distinct strategies emerge which have 
benefitted their market position and growth.  The Apple App store was first established in 
July 2008 starting with only 500 apps.  The steady stream of compatible devices 
complementing the store grew to approximately 303,000 apps in January of 2011.  The 
Android Market was established in October of 2008 positioned as an open-sourced platform 
for developers to explore.  The market features a large proportion of free apps 
(approximately 67% on Android and 37% on Apple).  The number of apps on the app market 
grew quickly reaching 20,000 apps in about 450 days.  In the two months from January 2011 
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to March 2011, the number of apps on the Android Market grew from approximately 151,000 
apps to 204,000 apps.  In the same period, apps in the Apple App Store grew from 303,000 to 
331,000 apps (Figure 2).  The growth can be attributed to various factors such as lower 
registration costs, no approval process and more content freedom.   
2.2 Primary Components and Platform 
Analyzing the data of smartphone OS market share and growth of apps, it is evident 
that the incompatible platforms are converging towards two providers: Apple iOS and 
Android OS whereas the BlackBerry OS is falling behind (Figure 3).   It should be noted that 
the Android lags behind Apple in the overall mobile OS market share 42.8% to 39.61% in 
November 2011
2
.   
Hardware is the physical component in the system.  It is a device that allows the users 
to interact with the platform and apps developed.  With the growing phenomenon of mobility 
and portability, the growth of mobile platforms has increased steadily.  Discussed briefly 
above, hardware for mobile apps/computing can be accomplished on various devices 
including: smart/cellphones, netbooks, tablets, etc.  Much of the research on two-sided 
markets focus on the idea of openness which is the rationale of the number of sides an 
organization undertakes.  For instance, Apple and RIM both produce their own device that 
supports their platform.  Apple produces a line of smartphones, tablets and portable media 
players that support iOS and facilitate the use of apps.   
                                                     
2
 Android is the market leader in mobile OS in the smartphone market but the Apple OS continues to lead in the 
overall mobile OS market since they possess a more diverse product line; Apple continues to have a stronghold 
in the tablet and portable media player (iPods) market which utilizes their mobile OS.   
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In contrast, Google does not produce its own devices (or very limited) that support 
their OS.  Devices that support their platform comes from various third party agents; the most 
notable manufacturers being Samsung, Motorola and HTC (Figure 4).  The Android 
ecosystem is highly fragmented such that the installed base is actually made up of a wide 
assortment of devices, manufacturers and OS versions.  A survey conducted by 
OpenSignalMaps found that from 61,389 devices, there were 3,997 distinct devices across 
599 distinct brands
3
.  Similar trend of fragmentation also exists among the versions of 
Android OS installed (OpenSignalMaps, 2012).   
The Android platform uses strict standards for all devices being labelled Android-
compatible to minimize the fragmentation; however, being an open-sourced platform, 
manufacturers are free to modify the provide source code.  This reinforces the fragmentation 
but it also results in a staggered product introduction cycle.  New Android devices 
continuously enter the market from the various manufacturers.  Apple devices exhibit a much 
less continuous stream of introductions since they control their manufacturing.  Clearly, more 
unique Android devices enter the market at a quicker rate compared to the Apple platform. 
 No definitive set of characteristics exists that defines a smartphone.  Broadly, the 
paper will continue to use the term smartphone to define devices embodying the following 
properties: 
1. Voice-to-voice capabilities and other telephone communication capabilities such as 
dialing, speakers, text messaging, etc 
                                                     
3
 Some of the distinct devices are due to the installation of custom ROMs (Read Only Memory) which are 
synonymous to a modified OS for the device. 
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2. Personal Information Management (PIM) which embodies the features of the 
previous PDA devices. 
3. Connectivity to the internet through data plans and/or Wi-Fi hotspots. 
4. Ability to utilize and be receptive to 3rd party applications 
The set of properties is not an exhaustive list but provides a base understanding of the 
capabilities of a smartphone versus a feature phone (PCMag – Smartphone Definition, 2012).  
Note that the properties avoid physical characteristics of the devices since many of the 
technical specifications can vary greatly. 
2.3 Complementary Components 
As of November 2011, there are 4 major app platforms which account for 
approximately 930,000 apps.  The apps stores are: Apple App Store (510,412), Android 
Market (330,845), BlackBerry App World (50,015) and Windows Marketplace (40,000).  
The app market is currently in a state of rapid growth; however, much of the growth has been 
from the Apple and Android platform. 
The apps markets are currently competing to establish a larger installed base, and thus 
the annual revenue may not be a good indicator of market structure. Instead, the number of 
applications available in each platform, the number of annual or monthly downloaded apps 
can provide more accurate delineation of the market structure. The number of cumulative 
downloads as of November 2011 are 15 billion, 4.5 billion and 1 billion for Apple, Android 
and BlackBerry respectively (Table 1).  Note that the figures of apps will include the items 
such as ebooks and media that are available on the various app storefronts.  These items can 
be downloaded onto the various mobile platforms but require much less development costs 
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and less interaction with the end-user.  For instance, BlackBerry App World contains a high 
number of ‘themes’ that provide customization but provides little outside of aesthetics; as of 
Nov 2010, App World had over 15,000 apps but approximately 3,800 consisted of themes 
(McInnes – BlackBerryCool, 2011).    
Looking at the structure of the entire platform, the majority of apps on any platform is 
developed by third party groups. There are examples of hardware manufacturers developing 
applications but those applications fill particular niches rather than appeal to the masses.  
Comparing the two main app storefronts, clear differences emerge in how the platform 
manages their applications.  For instance, the Apple App Store heavily controls the 
applications developed for their devices.  Apple apps must go through approvals which 
subject the applications to strict guidelines.  The Android Market takes a passive approach in 
their governance allowing for a wider range of subject matter to be published.  Under the 
Android Market, it is possible to develop applications with rather trivial functions or even the 
presence of adult content.  VisionMobile suggests this passive approach aligns with 
supporting the ad revenue side of Google’s operations (VisionMobile – Open Governance 
Index, 2011). 
 An interesting issue emerges on the types of application that can be developed on 
each platform stem from the openness of the source code.  The iOS is developed under a 
closed source code approach while the Android is open.  Since the Android source code is 
open, developers have a larger breadth of functions they can access.  For instance, on the list 
of most popular apps on Android of all time include apps that can change the layout of the 
OS, ‘kill’/manage tasks and processes, interact with key settings of the OS, etc (TechCrunch, 
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2010).  Examples of these apps are Root Explorer (Filer Manager), Advanced Task Manager, 
Beautiful Widgets, SetCPU for Root Users, etc.  These types of apps are far less apparent on 
their Apple counterparts.  Evidently, applications are not compatible across the platforms 
which force developers to develop applications on multiple platforms should they want to 
appeal to both markets.   
Asides from applications being incompatible across platforms, applications and 
components can also be incompatible across devices/brands.  Even though most applications 
are developed by 3
rd
 part groups, some applications are being developed by the respective 
hardware manufacturers.  Concentrating on the Android Market, Samsung, which 
manufactures a range of device utilizing the Android OS, also develop applications specific 
to their product lines.  Leveraging off their network of products, Samsung has begun to 
develop applications that are compatible only with their own devices allowing users to 
enhance the connectivity of their products (e.g. controlling their DVD players, televisions, 
etc. via their smartphone).   
In early 2012, to coincide with their launch of the Samsung Galaxy Note, Samsung 
partnered with the developers of Angry Birds, Rovio, to supply the game on their Galaxy 
Note for free (which also included a special stage exclusively on Samsung devices).  
Following the same strategy, an app formerly only available on the iOS platform, FlipBoard, 
has worked with Samsung to provide the application on Android.  The partnership provided 
users of the new Samsung Galaxy S3 to have exclusive rights to the application for the first 
month of introduction (Sadewo – Android Authority, 2012).  Ultimately, users who choose to 
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utilize Android through Samsung products would benefit from these extra perks but at the 
same time, incur higher costs to switch out of their brand.   
However, much of the device-specific switching costs can be seen through the 
fragmentation of the Android ecosystem.  As stated, the figures from OpenSignalMaps 
illustrated the volume of unique manufacturers, devices and OS versions within the platform 
(OpenSignalMaps, 2012).  This level of fragmentation coupled with manufacturers’ effort to 
differentiation the stock Android OS
4
 has led to the varying compatibility towards certain 
apps.  For instance, the popular ability of installing custom ROMs which are modified 
Android OS requires the user to ‘root’ their phone
5
.  Rooting is the process of granting 
administrative privileges to the user (Rose – PC World, 2011).  The complexity of rooting a 
phone can vary since it is dependent upon the technical specifications of the device, the 
degree of differentiation applied by the manufacturer, the stock version of the OS, etc.  
Certain devices can be rooted using a single app and other requires a lengthier process.  As 
well, since the custom ROMs are outside the realm of the Android Market, their 
compatibility across devices also varies (PC World – Rooting, CyanogenMod – Devices, 
2012).  The varying ability to root and customize specific phones supports the existence of 
device-specific apps. 
A simpler example can be attributed to physical accessories of smartphones such as 
battery packs and carrying cases where they are designed to fit perfectly with specific 
models.  The smartphone system contains a plethora of other accessories such as carrying 
                                                     
4
 Stock Android OS refers to the operating system installed on the given device by the manufacturer. 
5
 The most popular custom ROM to date, CyanogenMod, has accumulated approximately 3 million users as of 
August 2012 (CyanogenMod – Stats, 2012). 
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cases, screen protectors, batteries, etc. which can be unique to each individual device.  In 
particular to carrying cases, most devices (even within the same brand) very in design 
causing tight fit cases to be incompatible outside that device.  VisionMobile states that the 
phone accessories market to have been $32 billion in 2011.  By 2018, the market is estimated 
to be worth $84.6 billion globally (GIA via Kim – Gigaom, 2011).   To simplify the effects 
of these components on switching costs, the brand-specific switching costs will be 
categorized with the device-specific switching costs. 
2.4 Consumers 
Evidently, the market is comprised of consumers with various preferences which affect their 
adoption decision.  Price is a major factor which affects a consumer’s decision to adopt a 
platform and to invest in the complementary components.  Naturally, consumers download 
more free apps than paid apps.  A report from Distimo on December 2010 shows that on 
Apple, daily downloads of the top 300 free apps total to over 3 million whereas the top 300 
paid apps only generated approximately 350,000 downloads.  This trend of consumer 
behaviour being highly skewed to free apps is consistent across all platforms; however, the 
trend is most noticeable on the Android platform (Malik – Gigaom, 2009). 
 The trend towards free apps supports the description of apps to embody the properties 
of simplicity, cheapness and instant gratification (Economist, October 2011).  PinchMedia 
finds that app usage diminishes at an exponential rate where app usage can decrease 80% to 
90% after 5 days.  This result can be seen across all price points.  Even though games are the 
most popular category, only news (mainly sports) and social media apps attract users on a 
daily basis (148apps.biz, AppBrain, 2012; PinchMedia, 2009).  
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 This level of instant gratification of apps can be seen through the results of a 
conducted survey.  A Nielsen survey found that 59% of app users reorganized apps for easy 
access and 56% of users delete unhelpful apps.  As well, 62% of the users deleted unhelpful 
apps within the first 2 weeks.  It can be suggested that there is a certain level of 
experimenting of apps by users; however, most users stated that many obtained exposure on 
new apps through browsing the app store (49%) and by family/friends (34%).  Lastly, a 
major factor that influences a user from downloading/purchasing an app is the ratings and 
reviews it receives (PEW/Nielsen, September 2010). 
 It is clear consumers benefit from a strong network when utilizing apps due to the 
externalities.  Analyzing the Apple and Android platform, both have lively ratings/reviews of 
apps to assist this process.  However, the Android platform exhibits a much more skewed 
distribution of rating activity.  The top 30 apps have approximately 11,000 to 20,000 ratings 
on the Android market versus around 6,000 ratings for apps on the Apple App Store.  
However, the subsequent 210 apps, those apps have significantly smaller number of ratings 
on Android (few hundred per app) whereas the same grouping of apps for Apple remains 
relatively consistent with 2,000 to 6,000 ratings according to Mobilewalla (Gigaom, 2011).  
This leads to a narrow exposure of popular apps for Android users.  Nielsen Smartphone 
Analytics has reported that the top 50 apps represent 60% of the app usage.  More 
specifically, the top 10 apps represent 43% of the app usage (Kim – Gigaom, 2011). 
  It is not difficult to conceive that the smaller set of popular apps can hinder the 
demand and exposure of others apps and accessories.  VisionMobile suggests there is 
interdependence among components in the ecosystem that help strengthen overall demand.  
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Their report states that strong sales in smartphones and apps can help drive the sales of 
accessories (VisionMobile – Mega Trends 2012).   
 Finally, Hunch.com conducted a survey among 15,818 Hunch users to gather 
important insight on the demographic differences between the various mobile OS users.  The 
survey was conducted for the period of Q2 2011.  Most striking, the survey suggests Android 
users were 31% more likely to be later adopters, 57% more likely to favour full features over 
design and 100% more likely to be PC users.  In contrast, Apple users were 50% more likely 
to be early adopters, 122% more likely to favour design over full features and 100% more 
likely to be Mac users (Hunch, 2011).  Some clear differences between the two groups of 





Review of Literature 
3.1 Switching Costs 
The main area of research embodied in the mobile platform system relates to 
switching costs.  The research in the field of switching costs has extended in the past 3 
decades to coincide with the changing environment it is present.  The environment of 
research have started from single products (exogenous switching costs) industries to 
currently, system products where goods are interconnected and utility is dependent upon each 
other (endogenous switching costs). 
3.1.1 Exogenous Switching Costs 
In 1987, Klemperer produced a series of papers relating to the effects of switching 
costs on the competitiveness in markets.  A large body of subsequent research in the area of 
switching costs leverages the body of work done by Klemperer.  The model used by 
Klemperer and various others in this area of research is a Hotelling Line which represents a 
distribution of consumers in the markets and their relative preferences towards two 
competing firms.  In the general structure, consumers are situated along the Hotelling line 
where the two competing firms are situated on opposite ends of the line segment.  If we 
assume that both firms are producing comparable products, all things being equal, consumers 
along the line segment will tend to purchase from the firm closest to them.  Conceptually, as 
consumers are further away from a firm (or the representation of the product), the product is 
less appealing and so, there is a larger transport costs to move the consumer to that product; 
ultimately, that transportation cost would yield a larger negative effect on utility.  The point 
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in which a typical consumer is indifferent between both firms can be seen as an indifference 
point in the market (ceteris paribus, the indifference point would be the midpoint between the 
two firms).  Such indifference point would provide insight on the market share of the 
product.  Consumers to the left of the indifference point would choose one firm and the 
consumers to the right would choose the other firm.  The use of this model to analyze the 
competition in a market can be attributed to von Weizsäcker (1984).  The first in the series of 
Klemperer’s papers is a review of the findings of von Weizsäcker work, The Cost of 
Substitution (1984).   
In this landmark paper by von Weizsäcker, he suggests that the existence of switching 
costs associated with the products, the market is more competitive in the future.  Consider 
that each time a consumer decides to switch suppliers, he will incur switching costs.  It seems 
illogical for a consumer to switch products continuously over time since each switch will 
incur additional costs.  So, von Weizsäcker argues for the long-run that the consumer must 
make a decision based upon their expected future preferences and tastes.  This emphasis on 
their future preferences is a trade-off on their present period preferences.  Since consumer 
decisions are forward looking, suppliers are bounded by this constraint to treat their 
consumers well by providing competitive prices (markets).  If a firm indicates an attitude of 
exploitation of locked-in consumers, consumers will factor that into their decision and 
purchase from the other supplier.  He suggests that a firm’s reputation is the mechanism that 
will enforce the fair treatment of their consumers.  That is to say that if a firm exploits profit 
from locked-in customers in a particular period, new consumers (and consumers who may be 
still willing to switch) will not willingly incur high switching costs from that supplier 
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knowing that they will be exploited.  Consumers willingly incur high switching costs if they 
know future markets will be competitive (or are subject to relative constant prices).   
Klemperer’s (1987a) first paper in his series builds upon von Weizsäcker work and 
suggests a result contrary to von Weizsäcker.  Klemperer shows that the presence of 
switching costs makes markets more competitive in the first period and less competitive in 
the second period.  That is, he suggests that suppliers will exploit locked-in consumers since 
they would be able to exert monopoly power over those consumers.  His results differ from 
von Weizsäcker’s findings because Klemperer does not assume the presence of a reputational 
constraint which forces suppliers to hold prices constant.  So, a supplier’s success in the 
second period is the ability to exploit profit from their locked-in consumers.  This implies 
that the key success factor for a supplier is obtaining large market share in the first period.  
This leads to intense competition in the first period and less competition in the second which 
is a contrast to the results of von Weizsäcker.  Klemperer (1987b) extends his findings 
further suggesting that the monopoly in the second period does not necessarily benefit 
suppliers.  As stated, the ability to exploit profit from locked-in consumers requires intense 
competition in the first period.  It is ambiguous how the profit from period two compares 
with the costs of competition in period one.  It is plausible that such intense competition 
erodes the profits in period two, effectively creating a zero profit scenario across the time 
horizon. 
Klemperer (1987b) and Farrell and Shapiro (1988) build upon this area by analyzing 
the relationship between the two suppliers within this switching cost construct.  The presence 
of switching costs associated with the goods make firms’ price similar to a collusive 
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behaviour in the market (Klemperer 1987b).  Switching costs makes the demand of goods 
more inelastic; if a consumer is locked into a supplier, a small price cut from a competing 
supplier provides little incentive to switch since they are committed.  With this established, 
both suppliers in the market would decide to hold prices instead of cutting to induce 
switching.  Without switching costs, suppliers may have an incentive to cut prices to build up 
their market share and increase profits.  But with switching costs, the market is segregated 
into sub-markets where each supplier exert their market power within their own market, 
similar to an equilibrium established with collusive behaviour (Klemperer 1987b).   
These results were subjected to a constraint where the population of consumers is 
fixed and suppliers are competing for the same consumers in each period.  Farrell and 
Shapiro (1988) consider the effect of infusion of another set of unattached consumers 
(consumers who have not previously committed to a supplier).  They coined the term 
‘overlapping generation’ to refer to the inter-temporal differences among the consumers 
point of decision.  The model considers a supplier who is the incumbent where they are 
present in the first period and accumulated market share in the period.  In the second period, 
a new set of consumers enter the market with the possibility of an entry of another supplier 
(“new entrant”).  The results mirror the results of Klemperer which suggests that under 
switching costs, a market can be segregated into sub-markets.  If switching costs are 
significant and the incumbent possesses a sizable market share from period 1, the incumbent 
would not price goods to prevent the existence of the new entrant.  It can be more profitable 
for the incumbent to focus on exploiting the existing consumers than competing for the entire 
market.  This reinforces the idea that suppliers are less competitive in the second period with 
 
 23 
switching costs.  The large market-share coupled with switching costs allows suppliers to be 
less diligent in pursuing the new consumers (Farrell and Shapiro 1988).  This fat cat effect of 
suppliers can be seen in research from Tirole and Fudenberg (1984) on the under/over 
investment in expansion or Christensen’s view towards innovation.  This identification of 
attached/unattached and sub-market competition set the base for research relating to 
consumer price discrimination. 
Several economists have explored mechanisms where suppliers can use to profitably 
induce switching or the ability to price discriminate against attached and unattached 
consumers.  Chen (1997) investigates suppliers who use discount coupons for price 
discrimination compared to outcomes without price discrimination.  He finds that firms that 
engage in price discrimination are worse off and deadweight loss exists with switching costs.  
This reinforces earlier research done by Caminal and Matutes (1990).  They suggest that the 
use of coupons lessens the competitiveness in the market and using price commitment 
strengthens it.  This view is consistent with von Weizsäcker’s model where suppliers must 
commit to prices forced upon by the reputational effect which leads to more competitive 
pricing in future periods.  The importance of considering coupons and price commitment is 
the interpretation of whether switching costs is exogenous or endogenous.  In the model by 
Klemperer, the consumer incur the switching costs once they decide upon the supplier and in 
the perspective of the supplier, switching costs are exogenous.  However, under the models 
of Chen, Caminal and Matutes, suppliers can, to some extent, control the amount of 
switching costs that they or the consumer will burden (Chen 1997, Caminal and Matutes 
1990).    
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3.1.2 Application of Switching Costs in Antitrust Cases 
Before engaging in reviewing the more recent literature exploring endogenous 
switching costs, it is important to understand the context which legitimizes the ongoing 
exploration of this area of research.  The importance of analyzing switching costs and the 
structure of the market in recent years stem from several highly publicized antitrust cases 
before the courts.  The most notable involved Eastman Kodak Co. and Image Technical 
Services (ITS).  Kodak Co. were manufacturers of photocopier equipment and providers of 
services.  ITS was also a provider of support services upon the Kodak photocopier 
equipment.  The equipment market is considered the primary market where the services were 
coined the aftermarket.  This structure of the market is a practical representation of the 
models explored by Klemperer and others.  ITS argued that Kodak was conducting 
anticompetitive behaviour by restricting the availability of parts required to compete in the 
aftermarket.  As expected and echoed by the research, it is not unexpected a supplier will 
choose to exert a degree of market power in their sub-market with the presence of switching 
costs.  However, the ongoing debate and the bane of some economists is to assess the degree 
of market power a supplier has in the aftermarket.  A review by Shapiro and Teece on the 
case outlines the issues that need to be investigated (1994).  
The review suggests the importance of being able to assess market power and the 
effect it may have in the competitiveness of the market.  As stated above, the question lies in 
whether the market power in the aftermarket is justified for the intense competition in the 
primary market.  Lastly, as viewed from a different perspective, the authors state that the lack 
of market power in the primary market does not imply a lack of market power in the 
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aftermarket.  Kodak attempted to justify their competitive strategy by stating that the primary 
market was indeed competitive.  The significance of this fact is similar to the line of 
argument by von Weizsäcker where they suggest that should the supplier attempt to exert 
market power in the aftermarket, consumers would explore the alternative and the 
reputational effect will ultimately hurt a supplier’s ability to exploit for profit.  This 
reputational effect would force Kodak to remain ‘competitive’ in the aftermarket.  
Eventually, the courts concluded that Kodak was imploring anticompetitive behaviour since 
the reputational effect would only hold should consumer exhibit forward looking tendencies 
with perfect (or significant amount) of information.  In the end, this case does stress the 
importance of analyzing switching costs and its effect in the competitiveness of the market. 
3.1.3 Endogenous Switching Costs and Price Discrimination 
Borenstein, MacKie-Mason and Netz (2000) used a model similar to Klemperer with 
overlapping generations.  The findings from the model were consistent with Klemperer.  
They found that regardless of the market structure in the primary market, suppliers will 
choose to exert their market power in the aftermarket.  The stylized model of switching cost 
casts a shadow over the questions raised by Shapiro and Teece on the matter of antitrust and 
competition in a primary-aftermarket structure and the need for better assessment of market 
power in the aftermarket.  The emergences of these results stem from a fundamental 
assumption Borenstein et al has made in their model.  von Weizsäcker has argued that 
reputational effects will keep future prices constant since exploiting consumers in the current 
period will deter potential (unattached) consumers to adopting.  However, Borenstein et al 
echo the sentiments of the courts in the Kodak case where while they agree with the idea of 
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the reputational effect, the magnitude of such effect is largely unknown.  They argue that 
such effect may not provide sufficient incentives for suppliers to maintain competitive prices 
which allows for the results in their model.  
Thus far, the literature explored focused upon exogenous switching costs and 
endogenous switching costs burdened by the supplier.  Marinoso (2001) considers switching 
costs in the construct of the primary and aftermarket.  The primary market consists of sales of 
printers and the aftermarket involves the sales of compatible ink cartridges.  Evidently, both 
these types of goods are complements (or system goods where both goods need to be used 
together) and with incompatibility serving as a mechanism to induce switching costs, 
suppliers can implore pricing strategies to discriminate between attached and unattached 
consumers.  In the context of printers, the model looks at a consumer who requires one 
cartridge per printer.  In the second period when the cartridge becomes obsolete, the 
consumer is face with the decision to purchase another cartridge from the same supplier or 
upgrade the entire system.  Thus, the switching costs are decided by the incompatibility of 
cartridges such that should the consumer choose to change suppliers, the consumer would 
need to purchase a printer as well as a replacement cartridge.  The sequential purchasing of 
the component of the system allows the suppliers to discriminate in the second period against 
existing and new consumers.  Previous research has shown that it may be difficult to price 
discriminate when new consumers enter the market (or are face with an adoption decision) 
but under the model of Marinoso, the supplier can use bundling techniques to discriminate.  
New consumers require both components (i.e. a printer and a cartridge) whereby existing 
consumers only require a replacement cartridge.  Thus, a supplier pricing strategy would 
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depend on the price of their bundle versus the price of their competitor’s complement.  This 
enables the exploitation of locked-in consumers as well as attracting new consumers in the 
market.  It should be noted that Marinoso explores the facet of compatibility and suggests 
firms’ preference towards compatible components.  This is contrast to the typical thought of 
exploiting locked-in consumers through incompatibility as seen in the Kodak case; Marinoso 
supports the claim that the competition in the primary market drains the ability to leverage 
market power in the aftermarket (Haucap 2003). 
A fundamental assumption made by most of these models is the homogeneity of the 
consumers.  The literature discussed above factor in the diversity of the consumer population 
through the distance costs a given consumer would incur depending on the firm he chooses.  
However, this neglects the different behaviours that may occur from the diversity of 
consumers.  The different distance costs can change the outcome of the decision but it does 
not change how the consumer behaves.  Extension from these models from subsequent 
researchers attempt to account for the differences in preferences and behaviour.  The results 
from models hinging upon long term commitment and reputational effects focus upon 
foresighted consumers.  That is, a consumer makes an adoption decision and rationally incurs 
switching costs considering the expected value/costs of the decision.  As Klemperer, Shapiro 
and Farrell infer that these foresighted consumers make the current demand inelastic since 
the effect of current period price cuts are diluted in a longer time frame; ultimately, firms 
earn zero profit over the period.  Miao introduces the concept of myopic consumers who 
make decisions based upon single period benefits.  He justifies the existence of myopic 
consumers through empirical findings and suggests that a myopic heuristic may be used by 
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some consumers to simplify complex decision making.  More importantly, he finds that with 
the present of myopic consumers in the population, the traditional thought of zero profit 
might not come to fruition.  Other models assume that myopic consumers are protected by 
foresighted consumers; however, Miao shows that since consumers behave differently, 
suppliers can identify and exploit them which produce profits.  Furthermore, even if suppliers 
possess different production efficiencies, the presence of myopic consumers provide an 
incentive for less efficient suppliers to remain in the market.  The result is consistent with the 
court’s position in the Kodak cases stressing the imperfect information of consumers allows 
for the monopoly position in their respective aftermarkets.  However, it is important to note 
that policy implications are once again ambiguous.  Like other before who suggests welfare 
effects are sensitive to certain parameters, Miao cautions that policy to standardize 
technology (weakening switching costs in the aftermarket) may not necessarily protect 
myopic consumers (Miao 2010).  Xue et al. (2006) present a model analyzing switching costs 
and customer retention with myopic consumers in the market.  They also stress the fact that 
myopic consumers in the market can produce less than optimal social outcomes in terms of 
firm’s investment in technology.  However, they do not take a policy approach to remedy the 
issue.  they suggests that firms can bridge the gap between myopic and foresighted 
consumers which would lead to investment in technology and ultimately, consumers would 
be more willing to accept higher switching costs associated with the benefits (Xue, et al. 
2006). 
Doganoglu (2010) considered the assumption where consumers do indeed switch 
suppliers over periods.  Previous models have shown that consumers do not switch at 
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equilibrium which is argued by a certain degree of foresighted consumers and switching cost 
barriers.  However, Doganoglu questioned the assumptions of high switching costs and 
homogeneous products such that consumer preferences may change over time or their true 
preferences would be revealed in subsequent periods.  By considering this, he shows that 
contrast to traditional views, a low level of switching costs can in fact produce lower prices 
than compared with markets without switching costs.  Ultimately, the magnitude of the 
switching costs (where high switching costs are prohibitive to switch and low switching costs 
are not) forces the suppliers to consider whether it can exploit their consumers or more 
profitable to retain their consumer base to future periods.  These results prove important to 
policy makers as it questions the traditional views of switching costs softening competition 
and echoes the warnings of Miao suggesting that this generalized oversight of switching 
costs may produce policies and strategies that end up hurting the consumers or subsets of 
them.  
3.2 Consumer Technological Adoption 
There are various factors which affect a consumer’s choice towards adopting a 
particular technology or good.  Evidently, switching costs plays a large factor in a 
consumer’s choice; however, the benefits from improved products and network externalities 
are also a major factor. 
3.2.1 Replacement Framework 
Joseph Guiltinan (2010) has compiled a review of recent literature relating to the 
consumer adoption and investment decisions.  Summarizing the consumer decision process 
from Ellison and Fudenberg (2000), they note that a consumer’s replacement decision is a 
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process which involves various factors that balance the utility of the current good versus the 
replacement good subject to the costs between the two choices.  Using this framework, a 
consumer chooses the option which yields the greatest utility less the associated costs across 
the time horizon.  Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) used this framework to model the decision 
process of consumers in the software industry.  Consumer software usually does not involve 
heavy investment towards maintenance/repair and/or even resale.  Dynamic models after the 
Ellison and Fudenberg framework considered aspects of repair and maintenance to determine 
optimal replacement (Hartman 2001, Wang 2002).  By considering these properties, the net 
price of replacement (i.e. price of new good less trade-in value) becomes an endogenous 
function.  The model in this paper will closer resemble the framework of Ellison and 
Fudenberg since it will assume the salvage value of smartphones to be exogenous. 
It should be noted that others have investigated replacement decisions through more 
psychological factors.  Many of these empirical studies have found some consumers consider 
technological obsolescence as well as functional obsolescence.  That is, a consumer may 
replace a good to remain in sync with current technology and not necessarily due to failed 
performance (Cooper 2004, Bayfus 1991).  van Nes and Cramer (2008) considers different 
properties of a product which can trigger a consumer’s “need arousal” when it comes to new 
products (Guiltinan 2010).   
The model in the paper does not consider those psychological factors which ‘arouse’ 
a consumer to replace a product.  Others have considered the psychological factor of loss 
aversion.  Okada (2006) considers loss aversion to be the disutility which results from 
removing oneself from an attached good and/or the indirect costs of replacing the good.  This 
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concept is loosely applied to the model where a consumer can lose an opportunity given a 
wrong decision in an uncertainty market (Guiltinan 2010).  However, this loss/risk aversion 
in the model considers much less of the psychological factors as described. 
3.2.2 Incompatibility and Standard Wars 
Another aspect of consumer adoption revolves around standards and compatibility.  
Much of the research in this area revolves around the concept of switching and policy 
implications around competition.  From the section above, without an agreed upon standard, 
the incompatibility creates switching costs for the user.  A large body of work has been done 
around the concept of ‘Standard Wars’ (Stango 2004) or the idea of competing standards.  As 
stated, since incompatibility creates barriers in switching, consumers are usually hesitant to 
adopt in a market with competing standards.  The uncertainty in which standard would be 
dominant usually has a negative impact on welfare since consumers are slow to adopt the 
underlining technology which curb innovation and productivity gains.  The policy 
implications in this area focus on a balance of trying to allow standards to compete but also 
to remove the uncertainty by moving towards a dominant technology. 
 This leads into the research of Klemperer where firms compete heavily in the first 
period to obtain the installed base to reap the benefits of the locked-in effect in the future 
period.  However, another effect that must be considered is this hesitancy of consumers.  
Consider the example of the QWERTY keyboard layout.  Before the QWERTY layout was 
deemed the dominant layout in the 1970s, consumers were hesitant to invest in the 
typewriting technology fearing adoption of an inferior standard (Farrell and Saloner 1986).  
Adoption of the technology required investment in physical typewriters as well as education 
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of users which would constitute as the switching costs.  It was only after the QWERTY 
layout was considered the dominant layout did firms adopt the technology for mass usage 
(David 1985, Foray 1997).   
  The model in this paper does not directly address the hesitancy of consumers 
adopting a particular standard (i.e. Apple versus Android).  On a market view, it is assumed 
that both platforms can coincide in the same environment similar to the market structure of 
video game consoles.  However, it is possible to address this effect in the section considering 
uncertainty in the market. 
3.2.3 Network Effects and Externalities 
The smartphone market clearly fits into the construct of a two-sided market 
encompassing network effects and externalities.  Considering the OS as the platform, it 
brings together primary devices and complementing components.  The network externality 
can be seen from either side of the platform such that greater usage of devices and/or 
components benefits the users in the platform (Economides 1996).  Likewise, across both 
sides of the platform, greater consumption of one side benefits the other as well which is a 
key to a two-sided market construct.  As the install base of smartphone users increase, it 
strengthens the demand of components and vice versa.   Rysman (2009) provides a good 
overview of the two-sided market construct. 
Through the context of the QWERTY example, one can understand the benefits of 
broad adoption of a technology or standard.  Namely, as the number of users of the 
technology increases, there will be a greater network effect and positive externalities.  When 
the QWERTY keyboard became the dominant standard, typewriters manufacturers only 
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needed to produce one type of keyboard opposed to carrying multiple types.  Users only 
needed to specialize in this particular layout allowing them to become more proficient 
towards the one layout but also, provide a larger pool of candidates for firms who required 
typewriting skills.  This larger population of QWERTY-skilled workers and the certainty of 
the standard, firms invested into the typewriting technology which helped improved 
productivity (David 1985, Foray 1997).  Evidently, there are many benefits in this scenario 
and other similar two-sided market constructs.   
However, it should be noted that these benefits also lead to increased switching costs.  
Regardless of the existence of a ‘better’ keyboard layout, its productivity gains may not 
justify the costs of changing layouts.  Even though the Dvorak keyboard layout was 
considered the superior layout, after the adoption of QWERTY, the cost would prove too 
much to switch.  As described, a change in layout would require changes from firms who 
employ users and users must retrain (Foray 1997).  This locked-in effect largely drives the 
results of past research suggesting firms compete heavier in current periods for future profits. 
Many of the research models with the assumption that the market will be willing to 
make a decision between two firms with uncertainty opposed to waiting until a dominant 
standard emerges.  This assumption can be justified where two (or more) standards can 
coexist in the market such that consumers do not run the risk of being ‘stranded’ onto an 
inferior technology.  Farrell and Saloner (1986) consider the scenario where competition of 
two standards is not so seamless.  They suggest that adoption is a gradual process such that 
consumers experience different levels of welfare at different time points of adoption.  In 
particular, since much of the benefits of the network effects occur after mass adoption, many 
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of the early adopters do not experience those benefits in the early stages.  With this transition 
period, Farrell and Saloner examined the effects of competing firms trying to curb adoption 
through preannouncements and pricing strategies and its effect towards innovation. 
In tune with the two-sided market construct, Church and Gandal (1993) consider the 
complement side of the network effect in analyzing the software in the computer market.  
Since the complement market is such an integral aspect of the system good, they suggest the 
characteristic of those complementary products can lead to over-adoption towards the 
underlying technology. 
The model in the paper mirrors the Church and Gandal construct such that a heavier 
emphasis is placed on the interaction of components in the adoption of smartphones.  
However, the robustness of interpretation on the parameters of consumer preferences allows 







The structure of the smartphone platform industry conforms to the configuration of 
“system goods.”  System goods involve a primary good and a set of complementary goods 
which are purchased sequentially after the adoption of a primary good.  The complementary 
goods are purchased to obtain additional utility from the primary good and the set of 
complementary goods is considered horizontally differentiated products (Marinoso 2001).  In 
the context of the smartphone platform, the apps are horizontally differentiated such that the 
quality of a particular app on a given platform is similar.  
4.1 Assumptions 
Consider a Bertrand duopoly market structure in which two smartphone platforms are 
available: Apple iOS (by Apple) and Android (by Google).  Due to natural deterioration and 
planned obsolescence, the primary hardware device lasts only for two periods. Being a single 
device provider, Apple is assumed to introduce new hardware devices every other period. On 
the other hand, hardware devices utilizing the Android platform are assumed to be introduced 
every period.  The size of the quality improvement of new devices at the end of the second 
period is assumed to be the same, but the Android devices introduced at the end of the first 
period have more features than the older model
6
 (including Apple device introduced at the 
start of the first period). In addition, the older Android device will be subject to deterioration 
through use and through the obsolescence due to introduction of a new device.  The shorter 
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 The subjectivity of metrics barred a direct comparison of Apple to Android devices; however, the comparison 




product introduction cycle of the Android platform quickens the rate of perceived planned 
obsolescence which in turns devalues the existing products in the series (Figure 5).  Utaka 
(2006) suggests that products in a market with shorter product introductions (or more 
frequent introductions) deliver a higher rate of perceived planned obsolescence to consumers.     
The price of the devices on both platforms is identical in period 1 and the price of the newly 
introduced Android device in period 2 will be lower by the salvage value of the existing 
device.  We naturally assume that there is a market available that allows a consumer to sell 
its existing Android device.  However, to simplify the case, the second hand market will not 
exist prior to the first period so that the set of consumer choices will remain between a newly 
introduced Apple or Android device.  
Each of the OS platforms is designed using a different computing language such that 
the apps are not directly compatible across platforms.  While the same app title may exist on 
both (or multiple) platforms in practice, they are developed separately as independent apps.  
We assume the prices of paid apps are the same for each type of platform. Secondly, the set 
of components will exhibit marginal diminishing returns on utility.  However, for simplicity, 
the model does not introduce deterioration of the set of components.  The lack of 
deterioration of components will not change the main observations from the model unless 
deterioration is rather large.  So, it will be assumed that complement components have a 
longer life than the hardware such that consumers face the incursion of switching costs.   
In addition, there will be two types of components in the market: device-specific apps 
and platform-specific apps.  Device-specific apps would be complementary goods only 
compatible with a particular device, whereas the platform-specific goods will be compatible 
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across all devices under the particular platform.  The device-specific goods would be 
analogous to hardware-related components such as the customization of the OS through 
ROMs and the physical accessories such as carrying cases and battery packs.  The platform-
specific components would be the software/content consumers use that are only compatible 
with the given platform.  Typically, these components would be apps for gaming, social 
networking, news updates, etc.  
Given a fixed price of hardware, consumers choose only one type of platform (or 
hardware device) between Apple and Android. The primary component is ex ante 
homogenous but ex post heterogeneous, and thus consumers will be faced with incompatible 
platforms, different learning curves and redundant features if they adopt both technologies.  
Consumers are uncommitted and are not affected by other externalities of the platforms.  
Thus, a consumer’s adoption decision will be made independently from external factors
7
.  
This assumption can be justified by focusing on the set of consumers who are making their 
first purchase decision in the mobile platform environment.  If this assumption is not made, 
the structure of system goods can present other effects which influence a consumer’s 
adoption decision.  For instance, since the model is presented such that complement 
components (i.e. apps) are incompatible, they serve as a means to lock-in consumers and 
deter them from switching to another platform.  It is possible that a consumer has already 
indirectly adopted a platform through a vertically differentiated primary component (e.g. 
                                                     
7
 A particular externality that will be excluded from the model is the effect of network externalities of other 
consumers on the choice maker.  There are various papers which state the presence of an effect from these 
direct network externalities towards undecided consumers.  The proximity of the effect to the decision maker 
(e.g. users who are kinship versus strangers) also affects the equilibrium choice.  The assumption of small 
consumers will encompass a relatively uniform distributed market share.   
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mobile media players, mobile tablets, personal computers) which presents a higher switching 
cost than compared to an uncommitted consumer.  That is, a consumer who has purchased a 
MacBook laptop (Apple) is more likely to adopt an Apple smartphone opposed to an Android 
(Hunch, 2011).  So, the refinement of the consumer set reduces these locked-in effects in the 
consumer adoption decision.  So, the model will consider the purchasing behaviour of a 
consumer who has already adopted the Android device in period 1. 
4.2 Consumer Adoption Model 
Consumers receive utility both from the primary component, the device, and from the 
set of complementary goods, apps.  Even though the discussion of complementary goods 
could also include accessories, the term apps will be used as a generalized term.  There are 
two types of apps i = {m, n} and the allocation between the set of components is analogous 
to a Hotelling model.  The consumer’s position along the line will indicate the allocation 
between the two app types.  We will assume that the m-type components are incompatible 
with other primary devices within the same platform and n-type components are compatible 
across the same platform creating device-specific and platform-specific apps respectively.  
The consumer will begin with an Android device and his decision would be to decide the 
amount of investment and allocation of apps. 
The allocation of m and n type components would be affected by the consumer’s 
preferences towards hardware (θ) and software dimensions (γ).  Once the Android device in 
purchased, a consumer determines the level of investment (or spending) on m and n subject 
to their preferences.  A representative consumer’s utility in period 1 can be expressed as: 
                             √         (1) 
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where f(m) and g(n) represent the utility functions of m and n-type components respectively 
and pi is the price of each type of components.  The preference parameters are bounded 0 ≤ θ 
≤ 1 and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 where values approaching 1 would indicate high preferences/affinity and 
values approaching 0 would indicate low preferences/affinity.    The fifth term in equation 
(1), a penalty factor   √        , serves to enforce the consumer’s purchase decisions 
by penalizing consumers who deviate from their preferred allocation.   Consumers who 
exhibit s small distance between θ and γ would require a more balanced allocation than a 
consumer with a larger deviating hardware-software preference.  Lastly, c is a parameter that 
represents the strength of the interdependence between the two types of apps. 
 The penalty factor is analogous to the comparison of the actual component ratio to the 
ideal component ratio as defined by the purchase of {m, n} and the consumer preferences {θ, 







.  Broadly, the penalty a consumer faces will be determined by absolute 
distance between the two ratios.  In actuality, the penalty factor encompasses three elements: 
(i) deviation from actual to ideal ratio; (ii) magnitude of consumer preferences and; (iii) 
magnitude of consumer behaviour.  See Appendix A.1 for the derivation of the penalty 
factor.  It should be noted that it is assumed θ + γ ≠ 0 and m + n ≠ 0. 
4.3 One Period Model  
As a base case scenario, consider a myopic consumer’s decision in a single period 
model.  Assuming Cobb-Douglas utility functions for the components m and n where 
          
  and           
 , the consumer’s utility function is  
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            √         (2a) 
where α and β are both less than 1 due to diminishing returns.  The base quality of the apps is 
denoted by Wi and a constant c is added to determine the magnitude of the penalty factor 
towards the consumer. 
Non-Binding Penalty Behaviour  This behaviour occurs when the consumer incurs a 
penalty for his allocation; that is, his actual allocation will deviate from his preferred.  The 
utility maximization conditions are  
     
       
          
√        
    (3a) 
     
       
          
√        
    (4a) 
The optimality conditions are defined only if         .  If        , the function 
becomes indeterminate.  When          , it follows that √              
   .  From (3a) and (4a), the consumer will maximize his utility in the current period with 
the allocation:   
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Binding Penalty Behaviour  When        , the consumer incurs no penalty and 
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From the updated utility function (2b) and analogous to previous analysis, the consumer will 
optimize their component allocation by satisfying: 
    
  
    
         
      
 
 
       (3b) 
For simplicity, if it is assumed that α = β, (3b) can be reduced to    [
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 and it 
follows   
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The parameters α and β dictates the degree of diminishing utility of the app types.  From 
market observations, it would suggest that n-type apps (e.g. games) would exhibit higher 
diminishing returns. As the difference between α and β increase, the penalty-binding case 
would become dominant over a larger range favouring the m-type apps.  However, even 
though this is the case, the general observations with the condition α = β would still be valid. 
Summary of Consumer Behaviour  To summarize the effects of the penalty factor 
on the utility function, the consumer has the following demand for components: 
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The three cases formulated denote the scenarios when the consumer invests in greater, less or 
exact number of a particular app-type as defined by his preferences.  Figure 6 illustrates the 
cases with respect to   
  
  
 where ω represents the relative quality between n and m type 
apps.  With equal values of preferences, as the quality of m and n-type apps divert, the 
consumer would deviate from his preferred allocation and purchase more of the higher 
quality app all else being equal. 
 More specifically, the range in which a case is dominant varies with the values of the 
parameters.  The magnitude of these cases determines the sensitivity of the parameters with 
respect to consumer behaviour.  For instance, consumers with strong preferences toward both 
types of apps would exhibit a larger penalty-binding range than consumers with weak 
preferences.  This smaller range for consumer with weak preferences implies they are more 
sensitive to the quality and price of the apps.   
These results are justified in that it captures the inertia of the consumer.  The 
consumers with high preference values possess greater inertia in embracing the technology 
such that they would be less sensitive to minor utility changes.  In contrast, consumers 
exhibiting less inertia would be less enthusiastic about adopting and thus, would be more 
critical of the values of utility and price.  Figure 8 depicts the cases with consumer 
preferences θ = γ = 0.1.  Under these low preferences, the penalty-binding case is superior 
only when 0.93 ≤ ω ≤ 1.07.  In figure 7, this band for which the penalty-binding case is 
superior is significantly larger when consumer preferences θ = γ = 0.9 (0.52 ≤ ω ≤ 1.92). 
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Implications and Observations  It is important to understand the magnitude of 
each case with the consumer (and market) since the consumer’s purchasing behaviour varies 
within them.  For instance, consumers in the penalty-binding case exhibit positively 
correlated demand functions for apps.  Formally, the demand of n in the penalty-binding case 
is an increasing function with respect to Wm (and Wn).  As the quality of apps increase, the 
demand of n increases as well.  Since   
 
 
  holds in this case, the demand of m-type apps 
increase with n.   However, this positive correlation between m* and n* is not consistently 
carried over into the non-binding cases.  Through the formulation of these cases, the demand 
of m and n are independent of Wn and Wm respectively.  This independence implies that 
increasing Wm or Wn would not affect the consumer’s purchase pattern of the other 
component.  Likewise, the changes in prices have similar effects.  These results are 
consistent with the conventional thought that  
  
   
   and 
  
   
   (and consistent with n-
type).   
 However, it is interesting to note how large the effects are in relation to each other.  
Depending on the values of Wm and pm, it may be more efficient for a firm to increase utility 
or decrease prices.  That is, the magnitude of Wm and pm would determine whether |
  




   
|.  Figure 9 shows the demand of m in the non-binding case as a function of 
Wm and pm.  As seen in the figure, as pm increases, the demand of m becomes less sensitive 
with changes in Wm.  Likewise, with large values of Wm, the demand of m becomes less 
sensitive with change in pm with all other factors being equal.  The relation is consistent in 
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the penalty-binding case as well.  Figure 10 show the demand of m under the penalty-binding 
case which encompasses the same relations. 
 Lastly, analyzing preferences under the same framework provides like results.  From 
the non-binding penalty case where the consumer invests in more m-type apps than he 
prefers, the following relations exist: 
   
  
    and  
   
  
   
   
  
      and    
   
  
   
These relations suggest that as a consumer is favouring the investment towards m-type apps, 
if θ increases, this reinforces the consumer’s behaviour and he would continue his investment 
towards m-type apps.  The strengthened demand of m also drives up the demand of n.  
However, when γ increases, the demand of the two app types are no longer positive 
correlated.  The utility of increasing the demand of n does not compensate for the magnitude 
of the penalty in that the demand of m would ultimately decrease.   
 Note that the observations of the varying correlation of the demands of the app types 
are simplified for discussion.  The change in qualities, prices and preferences have been 
assumed to be minor in that consumers did not transition to another case.   For instance, from 
the above scenario, increasing γ would drive the demand of m-type apps down.  However, 
there may be a point where the consumers transitions into the penalty-binding case where the 
demands are positively correlated. 
 Firms must be aware of the different cases and the magnitude of the effects.  Clearly, 
as individual components in the system, strengthening the position of a specific piece (i.e. 
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improving quality, cutting price, increasing preference) will produce beneficial results.  
However, with respect towards the system, blindly supporting a specific component can be 
harmful towards a complementing piece and/or towards the system as a whole.  As stated, the 
correlation between the two demand functions can vary and so, strengthening one can lead to 
adverse results to the other.  Depending on the strategy a manufacturer wishes to undertake, 
they need to be aware of the correlation and how sensitive the parameters are such that a 
consumer may transition into another case.   
 As well, asides from the magnitude and correlation within the cases, the rate of 
change differs also varies.  For instance, from the scenario above, increasing θ can raise the 
demand for both types of apps but the increase towards m would be greater than towards n.  
Likewise, the increase of γ would increase n greater than the reduction in m.  Ultimately, 
depending on the strategy of the firms, they must carefully balance these countervailing 
effects. 
4.4 Two-Period Model with Switching Costs 
Now, consider a two-period model with a rational consumer who considers the 
switching costs across the useful life of the device.  In the second period, a new device will 
be introduced by a competing manufacturing where n-type apps are compatible but the 
consumer must replace his set of m.  At the end of period 1, the consumer has an option of 
keeping his existing device or upgrading to a newly introduced device.  If the consumer 
chooses to stay with his current device, his utility function is: 
               
      
    √         
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where Vs is the utility from the device from the previous period and the values of m and n 
would be identical to the set from period 1 since he does not need to replace them. 
If the consumer chooses to upgrade to the new device, he would gain the utility from the new 
device subject to the costs and from his set of components.  Notice that the consumer has 
additional costs from upgrading the device and replacing his set of m which is incompatible.  
The utility function under this scenario is: 
                  
      
    √                 
where Vu and pu is the utility of the new device from period 2 and the associated costs 
respectively.  The consumer would retain the same set of n-type apps in period 2 but would 
be required to purchase a new set of m-type apps denoted as m2. 
It will be assumed that the prices remain static across the periods and the base utility 
remains the same.  Generally, the consumer would upgrade his device in the second period if 
his set of apps do not form a prohibitive level of switching cost and the device introduced is 
superior to the old device.  Namely, the utility of the new device less price and switching 
costs is superior to the old device.  A formal argument will be made by considering the 
decisions a consumer will make.  
4.4.1.1 Non-Upgrading Consumers   
Consider that a consumer makes the decision at the start of period 1 that he will not 
upgrade to the new device since the improvements are not significant and/or the level of 
improvements do not justify its costs.  So, considering that the set of apps do not face any 
depreciation, the consumer would invests in m and n such that he will derive utility from the 
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components across two periods while incurring the cost once.  Evidently, given no 
depreciation, the consumer will purchase all the components in period 1 to derive utility 
across the maximum length of the two periods. 
 Similar to the myopic case, the consumer would invest in apps which maximize his 
utility.  However, the foresighted consumer would plan across the two periods which derives 
a function which is an aggregated form of a single-period function with the corresponding 
function in section 4.4.  The foresighted consumer would maximize the following utility 
function: 
             
       
            √         
Similar to the utility function for myopic consumers, the function for foresighted consumers 
also exhibit different cases.  Note that the function is based on static yields of the apps.  If the 
parameters relating to the utility of apps change, the utility function needs to be modified.  
For instance, consider if the utility of m apps increase in the second period associated with 
the new device, the term      
  can be modified to          
  where Δ reflects the 
level of improvement.  For simplicity, consider the static formulation without loss of 
generality.  The demand of apps for non-upgrading consumers is: 
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Again, it should be noted that the assumption α = β is made without loss of generality.  
4.4.1.2 Upgrading Consumers 
Consider a consumer who has made the decision to upgrade to the new device in the 
second period.  Since the set of m are incompatible across devices, the consumer would only 
derive utility from them when the specific device is employed.  After the upgrade, the 
consumer must invest in m for the new device.  Considering the ideal position of the 
consumer in period 2, the utility function coinciding with that position is  
             
       
             √         
The utility function above implies that for the two periods, in order to maintain the optimal 
set of components, the consumer must invest in the set of m twice in the two periods.  
Similarly, it is assumed the utility of the apps do not change for simplicity without loss of 
generality.  So, the demand of apps for the upgrading consumer is: 
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4.4.1.3 Comparison of Non-Upgrading and Upgrading Consumers 
Intuitively, it is not difficult to follow that the foresighted consumer invests in a larger 
set of apps since the costs of those components will be amortized across a longer timeframe 
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than their myopic counterparts.  That is, since the consumer considers the longer timeframe, 
each component provides a larger marginal utility than the myopic case.  However, since the 
myopic consumer optimizes his allocation per each period, it follows that the foresighted 
consumer over-invests in components in the first period.  Ultimately, the foresighted 
consumer would make up the difference in the second period where he experiences the utility 
of the components without incurring additional costs.  This brief assessment reveals the 
source of the switching costs a consumer will face.  The foresighted consumer optimizes his 
utility by over-investing in period 1 to reap the benefits in period 2.  Thus, this over-
investment creates a commitment whereby a consumer is locked into their original decision 
or realizes the loss. 
 Comparison of the two foresighted consumer cases yields similar results.  If the 
consumer decides to upgrade his device in the second period, the utility derived from m-type 
apps would only be present if the consumer re-invests.  Thus, the utility from m components 
are considered as single period investments which would provide lower marginal utility.  
This leads the consumer to purchase a smaller set of m which can also suppress the demand 
of n depending on the magnitude of the penalty factor.  For instance, a strong penalty factor 
would suppress the demand of n should the demand of m decrease.  Ultimately for the 
incompatibility, the result   
    
  and    
    
  emerges implying the non-upgrading 
consumer invests in the most apps. 
 Since it is established that the source of switching costs stem from the incompatibility 
of the apps and the potential loss of utility, a consumer would only choose to upgrade should 
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the new device compensates for the loss of utility.  More formally, a foresighted consumer 
would be indifferent between upgrading and not upgrading when 
     
    
                 
    
          
where N and U indicate non-upgrading and upgrading consumers respectively, Vi is the 
utility of the primary device and pu is the price of upgrading.  For simplicity, the price of 
upgrading includes the price of the device less the salvage value of the previous device and m 
components.  As well, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 represents a discount on the value of the older device which 
suggests a declining utility of the device through usage and/or natural rate of obsolescence.  
From this formulation, this would imply that when    
                 
 
, the foresighted 
consumer would be better off aligning his investment patterns towards the goal of upgrading 
devices in period 2. 
 So, this value of Vu reinforces the results above that the cost of switching is 
determined by the net improvement with respect to the older device and the loss of utility 
from the allocation of m and n.  Notice that the costs of replacing the set of m which are 
incompatible are embedded in the term, UN – UU, accounting for the lost utility.  With the 
assumption that the consumer has perfect information on deciding on whether to upgrade or 
not at the beginning of the first period, the outcome from the foresighted consumer would 
always be superior to that of the myopic consumer. 
Implications and Observations Naturally, the implications from the one-period model 
is also applicable in this case.  Specifically, the correlation of the demand still varies between 
the cases and the sensitivity of the consumer is dependent upon their preferences.  However, 
 
 51 
the two-period model allows firms to possibly segment the market based on preferences.  
Consumers committed to a decision would align their purchasing behaviour to support that 
scenario.  Namely, consumers in the market would possess different levels of switching 
which can lead to some being locked in towards a device and/or platform.  New entrants in 
the market can better cater products to a segment in which they can compete.   
 The value of Vu allows manufacturers introducing new products to gauge the level of 
improvement necessary which can induce upgrade or even platform switching.  The presence 
of the preference parameters in the model suggests new entrants can capitalize on consumers 
with low inertia such that the positioning of their product and/or apps, market segments may 
be available for profit. 
4.5 Extensions to the Model 
The two extensions that would be discussed are the effects of information uncertainty 
towards the consumer decision and the option of platform switching.  
4.5.1 Two-Period Model with Uncertainty 
Consider the case where consumers are uncertain about the parameters Vu and pu 
which suggests that the uncertainty stems from the new device introduction.  It would be 
assumed that the app quality and price will remain constant across the two periods.  The 
latter assumption is justified since due to the large number of apps and the fragmentation of 
devices, variation in those parameters are far less apparent in the short term. 
Utility Across Periods It is evident to see that committing to a non-upgrading decision 
exposes the consumer to the greatest risk since it requires the greatest level of commitment.  
 
 52 
In order to achieve optimal utility across two periods, the consumer over-invests in m and n 
apps in period 1 to reap the benefits from period 2.   A consumer who is foresighted would be 
inclined to purchase more components in general than their myopic counterparts.  Non-
upgrading consumer would invest the most in components, followed by the upgrading and 
myopic consumer.  Note that the comparison is based upon total component (m and n).  
Depending on the given set of parameters, the consumer may face negative utility in 
period 1 in order to achieve the gains from period 2.  It can be shown mathematically that the 
non-upgrading consumer experiences the lowest satisfaction through the first period utility 
function.  However, since it is established through the myopic consumer case that he is at the 
optimal one-period maximum, it follows that increasing investment in components will lead 
to a sub-optimal result.  This sub-optimal first period is the effect that leads to consumers 
locked into their decision.  In the previous section, consumers are willing to take these first-
period sub-optimal positions since they are certain of the benefits in period 2; however, if the 
parameters in period 2 are uncertain, a consumer must balance the decision of switching with 
their risk exposure. 
  Ultimately, the myopic consumer experiences the most balanced utility production 
across the two periods, followed by the foresighted, upgrading consumer and the foresighted, 
non-upgrading consumer absent of whether they have made the correct investment decision.  
Depending upon the amount of information and certainty, a consumer may consider not 
exposing themselves to such risk. 
Cost of an Erroneous Decision In a two-period model, a consumer would be presented 
with an opportunity to change their original decision.  That is, a consumer may wish to 
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change their decision should the newly introduced device no meet their original expectations.  
Formally, if     
                 
 
  the consumer is better off upgrading and act 
accordingly.  However, given uncertainty, should the value of Vu not satisfy this condition, 
the consumer may choose to revise his decision.  Since the utility of the new device will be 
revealed in period 2, the consumer can revise his decision now under perfect information.   
Consider first the case of the foresighted consumer who decides to upgrade in the first 
period and revises his decision to remain with the current device in period 2.  Since the 
consumer was foresighted, he would have invested in a level of m and n which exceeds his 
one-period optimal amount.  With no deterioration in the set of m and n, this consumer would 
optimize his allocation subject to his new decision by making no further investment in m and 
n.  The consumer who switches from an upgrading decision to a non-upgrading decision 
would simply retain the same device and apps for the next period. 
Now, consider the case where the consumer is switching his decision from a non-
upgrading decision to an upgrading decision.  This case is less straight forward since the 
consumer would be required to purchase a new set of m should he now choose to upgrade.  
However, the amount of m the consumer purchases does not necessarily imply that he would 
purchase the same amount from the previous period.  The problem becomes solving the 
second-period utility function with n given.  The amount of n from period 1 would coincide 
with the optimal n from the foresighted, non-upgrading consumer problem which could be 
situated in of the cases.  In period 2, the case the consumer resides in may differ from period 
1.  If in the second period, the consumer is in the Non-binding penalty cases, the optimal 
amount of m would be the same as the myopic consumer such that   
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If the consumer is in the penalty-binding case, the amount of m would be    
 
 
  since the 
value of n is given. 
From the above formulation, the effect on utility of changing decisions can be 
derived.  Utility from the original decision can be compared to the utility from the updated 
decision.  This provides a threshold in the deviation between the actual and expected device 
improvement in which the consumer would revise his decision.  That is, the device 
improvement must be significantly larger in order to warrant changing his decision from non-
upgrading to upgrading.  Thus, in a market with uncertainty, switching costs will present 
itself in the allocation of m and n, as well as in the correction of decision. 
More formally, consider the difference in utility between the decision to staying and 
changing decisions (i.e. Utility of the non-upgrader versus the utility of the non-upgrader to 
upgrader decision; and vice versa): 
(5a) Utility Non-Upgrading – Utility Non-Upgrading to Upgrading and likewise, 
(5b) Utility Upgrading – Utility Upgrading to Non-Upgrading 
Since it was shown that with perfect information, the utility of the foresighted consumer 
derives the highest utility if the decision is correct.  Thus, switching decisions provides less 
utility and the above differences are positive which constitute as the additional cost of 
switching.  Depending on the parameters and the consumer preferences, the difference 
between (5a) and (5b) can be positive or negative.  It may be that a consumer who starts with 
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the non-upgrading decision faces larger switching costs than the consumer who anticipates 
upgrading or vice versa.   
 The result may be ambiguous but consumers who begin in an upgrading position tend 
to incur a lower switching cost from correcting their decision.  When the quality of both 
types of apps is similar, the range in which the upgrading position incurs larger switching 
costs is smaller than the non-upgrading position.  As well, the magnitude of the costs tends to 
be lower for the upgrading position.   
Figure 13 represent the difference between a non-upgrading position costs versus an 
upgrading position; that is, (5a) – (5b).  When the value is positive, the cost of switching for 
the non-upgrading consumer is greater and vice versa.  Figure 13a illustrates the scenario 
where Wm = Wn = 3 and figure 13b on the right illustrates Wm = Wn = 10.  The figures are 
consistent with the suggestion that the upgrading position possess the smaller range and 
lower magnitude. 
When the quality of the apps begin to diverge, the about results become more 
dominating.  Figure 14a represent the difference between (4a) and (4b) where Wm = 5 and 
Wn = 3 and figure 14b possess values of Wm = 3 and Wn = 10.  Notice that the area in which 
the function is negative has reduced and the magnitude has dampened.   
With the uncertainty in the net quality of the new device, most consumers would take 
on less risk from beginning with the upgrading decision.  This observation can help 
understand the lower retention rate in this market construct.  The uncertainty reduces the 
appeal of heavy investment in apps which ultimately, reduces switching costs with respect to 
devices and platforms. 
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Implications The model is formulated such that the utility of apps is largely independent 
from the utility of the platform.  The consumer assesses the net utility of the device only to 
determine whether or not to upgrade in the next period.  However, after that assessment is 
made, the consumer’s allocation of m and n is determined by the utility of the apps.  That is, 
if the consumer deems the next period product to embody a large improvement which 
warrants upgrading devices in the next period, he will act accordingly (i.e. m* and n* as per 
the foresighted, upgrading consumer if    
                 
 
 ).  The values of m* and n* 
in this scenario will not change even if Vu continues to increase.  Ultimately, the uncertainty 
in the next period device, Vu, only affects the condition    
                 
 
. 
 So with this independence between the components and device, a consumer decision 
on the investment of m and n would be bounded by myopic case and the foresighted, non-
upgrading case.  Once again, it suggests that the myopic consumer invests in the smallest set 
of components but faces the most balance utility across the two periods with the least risk 
exposure.  The foresighted consumer, who chooses to forego upgrading, invests the heaviest 
in components with the largest deviation in utility and greatest exposure to lost utility.  Thus, 
depending on the risk characteristics of the consumer and the certainty over the assessment of 
the new device, a consumer may choose any of the 3 possible outcomes. 
 It should be noted that a rational consumer may indeed choose invests in m and n 
based upon a myopic mentality.  With uncertainty, the myopic choice provides the greatest 
flexibility, albeit at the expense of maximizing utility.  As well, it is consistent with the other 
economists who suggests that consumers who face complex decisions may opt to choose the 
myopic decision (i.e. maximize over 1 period at a time) in order to simplify the decision. 
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4.5.2 Platform Adoption and Switching 
Consider the presence of a competing platform where all apps are incompatible across 
platforms.  
Platform Adoption  In general, given that products are comparable and all things 
being equal, consumers will gravitate to the platform that better align to their preferences.  
Namely, consumers with high values of θ would adopt platforms where the quality of m-type 
apps are greater all things being equal.  This suggests that the market can exhibit a degree of 
segmentation across consumer preferences since manufacturers can identify different sub-
markets by behaviour.  With varying quality of devices and apps across platforms, the results 
may be ambiguous. 
Platform Switching  Consumers who adopt the myopic heuristic in spending 
towards apps would be more susceptible towards platform switching.  The reduced 
investment towards apps creates a lower barrier in switching platforms.  Specifically, since 
apps are incompatible across platforms, both m and n-type apps form the basis of switching 
costs.  Trivially in a base case if both platforms contain the same quality of components, the 
platform switching consumer would require a significantly better device from the competing 
platform to warrant switching.  This trivial observation is interesting to note since it is 
consistent with theoretical frameworks and market observations.  Consumers are usually 
worse off switching between competing platforms due to the transition costs.  Consumers 
would need to replace incompatible components as well as re-educate themselves.  This 
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higher switching costs associated with a platform supports the view slower adoption of a 
standard in a market where dominancy is unclear as outlined in section 3.2.2.   
 However, comparing the device introduction cycles sheds insight on how switching 
costs can vary between platforms in the same market.  Consider a platform where a new 
device is introduced every other period.  In the framework of the two period model, the 
consumer would face the decision to either switch platforms altogether in the second period 
or remain with the device through two periods.  There is no option to upgrade devices in the 
second period.  Notice that under this construct, the consumer would not face the risk that a 
new device in the second period would devalue his existing device.  Without the intermediate 
device introduction and the associated devaluation, consumers would be more willing to 
behave like the foresighted, non-upgrading consumer (as per section 4.4.1.1) which results in 
greater barriers to switch platforms and devices. 
 This provides a possible factor explaining the UBS findings on the retention rates 
between Apple and Android platforms.  The model suggests that the more controlled device 
introduction from the Apple platform leads consumers to incur a higher level of switching 
costs.  The fragmented system of Android creates larger uncertainty which dampens the 
demand of apps which lowers switching costs towards the platform and specific devices. 
 A more dynamic analysis of platform switching is not examined in this paper; 
however, the analysis would follow the same constructs.  That is, the consumer possesses the 
decision options as stated above as well as the option of available on the competing platform.  
The functional forms of the demand of components on the competing firms would be similar 




Discussion and Conclusion 
Throughout the paper, the model discussed two types of apps: device-specific and 
platform-specific.  It was assumed that platform-specific apps are compatible across devices 
and device-specific apps were incompatible across devices.  Both types are incompatible 
across platforms.  This is analogous to game apps and hardware/device customization apps.  
This distinction is important since the level of switching costs can vary when transitioning to 
different devices.  For instance, the switching costs of changing devices would be more 
heavily affected by the set of device-specific apps whereas both types of apps will affect the 
decision to switch platforms.   
However, the paper takes a simplified look on the varying types of components in the 
mobile ecosystem.  It is possible to consider components that are incompatible across 
platforms, devices and/or manufacturers.  For instance, generic games apps provide only 
switching costs toward platform switching whereas custom phone cases provide switching 
costs for devices and platform.  One can also consider components made from specific 
manufacturers that only work within the manufacturer.  For instance, there are various 
applications that are only compatible across manufacturers.  Under the Apple platform, it is 
evident to see the interconnected network through their use of iTunes and other similar 
means to connect all their devices.  Samsung, a manufacturer in the Android market, is 
employing a similar strategy where applications are available allowing their smartphones to 
interact with their brand of DVD players, printers and other hardware.  In general, it is not 
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difficult to consider the varying effects of these components on switching and loyalty 
towards platforms, devices and manufacturers. 
On average, surveys have shown that consumers under Apple exhibit a high level of 
loyalty towards the brand such that for their next replacement, they do not intend to switch 
platforms.  A survey conducted by UBS suggests that approximately 89% of the respondents 
for Apple users were expected to stay within their platform provider.  In contrast, Android 
users exhibited must less loyalty towards their brand.  The survey suggests that only 55% of 
the respondents for Android indicated that they intended to remain with the Android platform 
(Hughes – Apple Insider, 2011).   
More in-depth analysis shows that the brand loyalty is even less pronounced towards 
the hardware manufacturers.  Since Android devices are created by various 3
rd
 party 
manufacturers, a consumer committed towards the Android platform has many different 
options available to choose from.  The major manufacturers providing devices for Android 
include: Samsung, HTC, Motorola, LG, etc.  In the survey conducted by UBS, only Samsung 
and HTC exhibited positive consumer retention; the manufacturer’s brand retention was 39% 
and 28% for HTC and Samsung respectively.  Finally, it should be noted that the survey 
suggests that 31% of current Android users intend to switch to Apple in their next 
replacement period.  UBS Research suggests the strong brand loyalty towards Apple stems 
from a robust ecosystem that serves as a means to burden users with a higher level of 
switching costs (Hughes – Apple Insider, 2011).  The Apple ecosystem presents various 
primary component goods such as smartphones, tablets, mobile media players, etc. which are 
all centralized through their specific user account.   
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Considering the Android ecosystem specifically, it is evident that the level of loyalty 
among their users is much lower compared to the Apple platform and compared to the actual 
devices.  These observations are consistent with scenarios from the model.  The Android 
ecosystem is analogous to the model above such that homogeneous products (asides from an 
increase in performance which implies a higher utility) are introduced every period by 
different manufacturers.  It is assumed the products are relatively homogeneous suggesting 
that the manufacturers continue to compete for the same group of consumers and not 
establishing a new market segment.  From the model, several observations can be made that 
is applicable to the Android ecosystem as defined.   
Firstly, the presence of an upgrading decision in the next period leads consumers to 
consider the utility of the alternatives in the next period.  With perfect information, it is 
assumed that a consumer can gauge the threshold in which he would be better off upgrading 
devices in the next period.  It can be observed that when a consumer decides to upgrade 
devices in the next period, he will invest less towards components.  More specifically, the 
consumer would invest in less compatible and incompatible components across the period if 
he decides to change devices in the next period.  Intuitively, it is quite trivial to observe that a 
consumer would invest in a smaller set of incompatible components should he decide to 
switch devices in the next period.  Since the components are incompatible, the components 
become obsolete with the new device and a new set must be purchased.  The lower marginal 
utility derived from these components lead to the reduced demand.  However, the model also 
presents an interesting dynamic with the compatible components.  The interdependence of 
the demand of both types of components can lead to a situation whereby reduced demand of 
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one type of component also reduces the demand of the other.  As formulated above and most 
evident in the penalty-binding cases, when investment decision is highly influenced by 
preferences, reduced demand of one type of component can dampen the demand of the other.  
Ultimately, in the perspective of the firms (i.e. Android Platform/Google) where increasing 
switching costs may be beneficial, doing so may not be as simple as to increase demand of a 
single line of components (i.e. apps).  This strengthens the thought that the mobile device 
market has truly evolved to a system good whereby utility must be balanced across multiple 
components.   
A report compiled by Vision Mobile describes support this view of system goods in 
the mobile market.  The success of the platform embodies a ‘core business’ and a 
‘complement’.  A business case of Research in Motion and the BlackBerry can be examined 
through the framework of the model to justify their inability to retain consumers and their 
continuing distress.  Asides from the growing set of primary devices (e.g. cellphones, tablets, 
personal computers, televisions, etc.), Vision Mobile considers accessories to be a major 
factor of differentiation for manufacturers and platforms in this market space.  The 
importance of accessories comes from the addition of revenue streams and explored in the 
model, the incursion of switching costs to the consumer.   The Apple ecosystem is filled with 
various accessory lines connected through a unique connector.  This allows them to 
strengthen their hold on their consumers and build upon their network.  In comparison, the 
Android platform lacks such a developed market of accessories that benefit their hold on 
their users.   
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Vision Mobile assessed the accessories market for mobile devices in 2011 to be 
US$32 billion.  This figure is estimated to grow towards US$84.6 billion globally by 2018 
(GIA via Kim – Gigaom, 2011).  Currently on the market, there is an assortment of 
components which enhances the features, performance and the appearance of devices.  With 
respect to applications, there is a growing market for gamepads, styluses and other peripheral 
components. Global Industry Analyst (GIA) Inc. suggests the strong sales of smartphones in 
recent period have helped strengthen the sales of mobile phone accessories.  Furthermore, the 
breadth of features and capabilities of smartphones help drive the strong sales even more.  
Their research suggests that smartphone users spend on average US$60 on accessories versus 
US$30 for their feature phone counterparts (GIA via Kim – Gigaom, 2011).  It is evident that 
the growing size of this market and its interdependence with the platform leads itself to 
further research to understand the dynamics and how consumers behave.   
Secondly, it is important to observe that with uncertainty in the market, a consumer 
generally faces greater risk investing in more components which coincides with the non-
upgrading decision.  There may be cases where there is greater risk expecting to upgrading 
devices but the magnitude is generally not as wide compared to the first case.  Typically, 
uncertainty would result in consumers purchasing less total components in order to allow for 
flexibility in the next period.  This is a trivial observation which is consistent with much of 
the research in switching costs and standard setting.  With greater uncertainty in the future 
periods, consumers are less willing to adopt and/or incur larger levels of switching costs.   
The multiple manufacturers in the Android platform are conducive to have 
continuous, staggered product introduction which can create uncertainty for consumers.  
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Even though Google provides a common OS for all the manufacturers, the open-sourced 
property allow manufacturers to customize the platform to better interact with their hardware 
before introducing it to the market.  As well, the manufacturers may also introduce varying 
hardware which would be dominant in the future development.  For instance, with the 
success of the Android platform, many manufacturers in this market have been trying to 
differentiate themselves and provide stability (i.e. reduce uncertainty) with their subsequent 
devices.  However, various manufacturers have begun to introduce generational products that 
follow a more stable introduction cycle.  For instance, Samsung has introduced several 
generations of their Galaxy branded phones which follows a reasonable introduction 
schedule.  As well, their devices possess unique applications that only work with their 
devices.  Their devices contain Samsung Kies (and similarly, Kies Air) which attempts to 
maintain consistent interfaces/interaction with the device/platform.   
Comparing the Android and Apple platform, the former does provide greater 
uncertainty.  Due to the various manufacturers, many new innovations to hardware and/or 
software can introduce randomly and across various manufacturers.  Since Apple is the sole 
producer of their devices, large innovations usually coincide with a major product launch.  
Ultimately, consumers who have purchased an Apple device are only faced with a decision 
about switching or staying with the platform (opposed to the Android consumer who must 
also consider upgrading devices).  This can suggests that the lower uncertainty in Apple 
which would imply that a consumer who plans to stay with the Apple platform would invest 
into a larger set of components.  The uncertainty in in devices does not exist for the second 
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period and cannot lead to the effect of the dampening demand of components through the 
interdependence.  This can partly explain the higher loyalty exhibited by Apple consumers. 
Another result from the model that is consistent with observations in the market is 
that consumers with low preferences are more sensitive towards the parameters of the 
components.  From the model, it is shown that small changes in the parameters of the 
components can lead to consumers with low preferences changing their investment 
behaviour.  Conversely, consumers with high preferences are less sensitive towards similar 
changes.  Intuitively, this is justified since consumers with low preferences derive less utility 
and thus, would be more critical to the utility yields.  As described in section 4.3, consumers 
with high preferences are situated in a larger band in which the penalty-binding case is 
superior.  These consumers are characterized by investing in components that fully match the 
ratio of their preferences.  The high preferences and the interdependence of the demand 
support the larger range of the penalty-binding case.  That is, the preference towards both 
hardware and software related components forces the consumer to invest in both types 
regardless of the utility yield within the relevant range.  This is important since the demand 
of one component can reinforce (or dampen) the demand of another type of component.  
These type of consumers demand more components than consumers with lower preferences.   
There can be a strong implication for manufacturers of hardware and/or software 
components.  Clearly, if a manufacturer can gauge the magnitude of the interdependence a 
consumer exhibits, it is possible for a firm to drive up the demand (and thus, switching costs) 
through means of the complement component.  As well, manufacturers of devices and their 
associated accessories may position themselves to discriminate across consumer preferences.  
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Assessing the behaviour of the preferences, an observation can be made that low preference 
consumers invests less in components and possess lower switching costs.  These consumers 
may be preferable to build up a consumer base but possess unappealing purchasing behaviour 
for long term success of a platform and/or manufacturer.  Using this model, it is possible to 
consider this component effect on the switching costs and loyalty between Android and 
Apple platform users.  From the lack of standardization of accessories in the Android 
platform and the lack of breadth, results of the model would suggests that Android users 
would purchase less software related components from the weak assortment of the hardware 
related components.   
Many of the surveys and data collected have shown that Android consumers are much 
less willing to spend towards investing in software components.  This may partly be 
explained through the lack of hardware related components in the market which also in turn, 
support the lower switching and brand loyalty towards the Android platform and to the 
individual Android devices.  The Apple platform possesses both software components and a 
variety of hardware components which can mutually support the demand of these high 
preference consumers.  This can lead to ideal level of investment in both hardware and 
software components which help the Apple platform retain users.  Also, as suggested, the 
lower uncertainty under the Apple platform likewise supports this higher level of loyalty. 
Lastly, the parameter c in the penalty factor needs to be examined.  The parameter c 
can be considered as the coefficient of interdependence of the components.  Evident from the 
formulation, significantly large values of this parameter would lead consumers to always 
purchase based upon their preferences regardless of the utility yield of the components.  In 
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the extreme case of c = 0, the consumer would purchase each type of components 
independently.  Note that changing the value of c only changes the amount of components 
purchased in the non-binding cases.  That is, given a consumer is purchasing against his 
preferences which indicate that he experiences a better yield towards a particular component 
type, changing the value of c would move his allocation closer or farther away from the 
preferred allocation.  However, a consumer who is in the penalty-binding case, minor 
changes of c (i.e. the consumer is still within the penalty-binding case) would not change his 
actual allocation. 
This is important aspect to note since only when a consumer is in the penalty-
dominant case can manufacturers leverage the interdependence to support the demand of 
another component.  For instance, in the non-binding penalty cases, the utility yield of the 
other components does not affect the demand of the other.  Consider that a manufacturer 
produces both types of components.  Increasing the utility of m components would not 
change the demand of n components for non-binding consumers.  However, the demand for n 
components will increase for consumers in the penalty-binding case.  It should be noted that 
the converse is true such that deteriorating utility of a particular component type will also 
negatively impact the demand of the other component.   
Extensions and Future Research The model provides a simple framework to analyze 
what effect various components has towards an individual’s decision set and their willingness 
to incur switching costs.  Much of the research in this area focuses upon the 
manufacturers/firms and their pricing decisions/strategies.  This is the natural extension of 
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the model.  The model has used stylized assumptions to simplify the interpretation and 
results.   
Namely, the model focused primarily on one platform with two staggered 
manufacturers and the component parameters were largely exogenous.  In the context of the 
environment, the Android platform was the main point of focus.  However, it can extend 
where consumers can also consider the change of a platform.  In the formulation, if another 
platform was present with similar features (e.g. Apple), the consumer would need to consider 
that component types m and n would be both incompatible (and needs replacement).  When 
considering only a device change, consumers consider only the incompatibility of m.  
However, this is a trivial extension where similar results would arise.  That is, the presence of 
an additional platform creates larger uncertainties for the consumer and if the consumer 
values flexibility, it would dampen the demand of components which form the basis of 
switching costs. 
More interestingly, the perspectives of the manufacturers need to be considered in 
this model.  Firstly, considering profit, it is possible to begin to assess whether the market 
can be segmented/discriminated through consumer preferences.  As well, this opens the 
discussion to whether platforms and manufacturers are truly in a competitive market 
segment.  The model considers the dynamic aspect of switching costs such that consumers at 
different preferences behave differently.  These behaviours produce different levels of 
switching costs that are not necessarily prohibitive should a competing device emerge.  A 
holistic view of the consumers may shed insight on the market segmentation. 
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This further leads to the examining of which segments may be most competitive (and 
profitable to obtain) and how individual manufacturers compete under competitive or 
oligopoly environment.  Similarly and briefly discussed above, it is worthy to consider the 
competition of components and how individual providers compete.  As discussed, demand 
effects on other components vary depending on the case a consumer resides in.  In particular 
to the Android ecosystem where a greater number of unique producers exist, the model can 
help identify how component producers interact.  
The model forms a base to analyze the mobile market where switching costs is much 
more dynamic across the preferences of consumers.  Switching costs incurred may not be 
prohibitive reducing the locked-in effect.  As well, the interdependence towards components 
and the varying compatibility across devices, manufacturers and platforms add to the 







A.1. Penalty Factor Formulation 
The model utilizes two parameters in order to emulate heterogeneous consumers in 
the market.  As seen in the general utility function (i), the penalty factor is   √        .  
Ultimately, the penalty factor is the mechanism which controls the consumer’s allocation 
between m and n.  Namely, the utility of m and n are not necessarily independent of each 
other.  The consumer’s preference will determine the ideal allocation of components 
assuming components are equivalent (the preferences suggests the balance of m and n 
regardless of price and utility yield).  Obviously, the set of m* and n* is the consumer’s 
actual behaviour.  Since the consumer can possibly invest more or less than his preference 
suggest, √         is analogous to |     |which obtains the absolute magnitude the 
consumer deviates from his preferences.  The penalty factor compares the actual behaviour 
with the ideal preferences and its magnitude is determined by 3 properties: (i) Proportional 
Difference; (ii) Magnitude of Preferences; and (iii) Magnitude of Actual Behaviour. 
Proportional Difference This property measures the difference between the ideal 
allocation and the actual allocation purchased by the consumer.  The penalty factor in the 
utility function is formulated by analyzing the proportion of m the consumer purchased 
compared to their relative preference towards hardware; however, it should be noted that the 
same analysis could be done with respect to n (and software preference).   So consider a 
consumer’s investment in m* and n* which would translate to the proportion 
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the absolute difference between the two proportions and the penalty increases are the 
deviation grows. 
Magnitude of Preference (MP) This property accounts for the strength of the 
preferences.  The proportion of hardware and software measures only relative differences; 
however, the magnitude of the penalty factor if the consumer possesses stronger preferences.  
For instance, consider two cases (a) θ and γ both equal 0.1 and (b) θ and γ both equal 0.9.  
Both cases yield a proportion of 0.5; however, it should be expected that the consumer with 
greater preferences will be more resistant to deviate from their ideal allocation.  In the 
context of the model, the greater resistance to deviate would imply the consumer incurs a 
larger penalty for deviating.   The proportions can be expressed in the context of a Hotel Line 
such that the extreme points correspond to a component portfolio of 0 m (all n) to all m (0 n).  
Since different values of preferences can produce the same proportions, the length of the 
Hotel Line needs to vary with respect to the absolute values of the preferences.   
 Consider the preference space of θ and γ where both parameters are bounded by 0 and 
1.  Given a pair θ-γ in the preference space, the Hotel Line used to express the ideal 
proportion is analogous to a line of negative 1 slope passing through θ-γ.  The line has a 
slope of negative 1 since the components are assumed to be equivalent.  The line segment is 
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bounded between the θ axis and the γ axis.  Since every Hotel Line representation has a slope 
of negative 1 and passes through the point θ-γ, then as the values of preferences increase, the 
Hotel Line moves further away from the origin and its length increases.  Ultimately, stronger 
preferences increase the length of the Hotel Line which accounts for magnitude of the 
penalty from preferences. 
 So, the length of the line segment can be derived using the Pythagorean Theorem 
since the line segment intersects θ axis and γ axis.  Since the line segment has a negative 1 
slope, it intersects the θ and γ axis at θ + γ.   
Using the Pythagorean Theorem, the length of the Hotel Line, based on the given θ-γ 
is:                         .  Thus,   √        √      . 
Magnitude of Behaviour (MB) This property accounts for the size of the component 
portfolio.  It should be expected that if a consumer is incurring a penalty for his currently 
allocation, a larger portfolio of the same allocation should result in a greater penalty.  The 
formulation of this effect is similar to the magnitude of preferences.  Once again, consider a 
line passing through (m, n) with a slope of negative 1, the absolute magnitude of the size of 
the component portfolio can be expressed as:                          .  
Thus,   √        √      . 
Formulation Given the form of the 3 effects, the total penalty function can be expressed as 
√[
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√      √      .  Consider two additional assumptions: (i)θ + γ ≠ 0 
and (ii) m + n ≠ 0.  Case (i) is justified since if θ + γ = 0, it implies the consumer has no 
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desire for hardware or software components and ultimately, these consumers would not enter 
the market.  As well, the purchase of any primary device (i.e. smartphone) would include a 
set of hardware and software components which would imply m + n ≠ 0. 
With the two additional assumptions, √[
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So,  √[
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√      √        √          ■ 
Therefore, the utility is:                              √         ■  
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A.2. Numerical Illustration 
 
Consider the illustration with a given set of parameters as expressed in the table 
below.  Notice that    
                 
 
 
so that it should be expected that the 
consumer is indifferent between upgrading 
and not upgrading.  Given these set of 
parameters, the utility for a myopic 
consumer is as follows:         Table 2: Parameters 
 
 Table 3: Myopic Consumer Utility per optimal Allocation 
Consider the 3 possible cases of the utility function, the myopic consumer maximizes his 
utility in the penalty-binding case.  He maximizes his utility investing in 0.828 in m and n 
components yielding utility of 1.4197 in period 1.  Should he decide to stay with his device 
in period 2, he would yield 4.7323 in period 2 or 3.076 should he choose to upgrade. 
 




In the case of the foresighted, non-upgrading consumer, he also falls in the penalty-binding 
case where he invests in 8.3472 units of m and n deriving a utility of 14.309 across two 
periods (-9.54 and 23.849 in periods 1 and 2 respectively). 
 
Table 5: Upgrading Consumers Utility per Optimal Allocation 
The foresighted, upgrading consumer invests in 2.1606 units of m and n deriving a total 
utility of 5.5558 across two periods (0.6173 and 4.9384 in periods 1 and 2 respectively).  
Under both cases of the foresighted consumer, the illustration reinforces the observation that 
the higher utility across the two periods comes from over-investment (which hurts current 
period utility) in period 1 for greater utility in period 2. 
 
Table 6: Summary of Switching Costs – Utility of New Product for Indifferent Consumers 
Naturally, since both types of apps provide the same utility yield, it should be 
expected that the consumer would purchase the same proportion of m and n which aligns 
with their preferences.  From the summary, as expected, the consumer is indifferent between 
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his decision to upgrade and his set of apps is significantly smaller if he chooses to upgrade.  
This reinforces the fact that even though n-type apps are compatible across devices, the 
switching costs stemming from the incompatible set of m suppressing the demand of n.  
Currently, the value of c, representing the strength of the penalty factor, is given as 0.35.  
Reducing this value enough can dampen the suppression of the demand of n.  For instance, if 
c = 0 (i.e. there is no penalty from allocation choice), the foresighted, upgrading consumer 
would invest in 8.3472 units of n which is identical to the demand of the non-upgrading 
consumer. 
 Comparing the myopic and the foresighted consumers, the foresighted consumer 
derives a higher utility than the myopic consumer.  The foresighted consumer both derive a 
utility of 21.50914 whereas the myopic consumer derives a utility of 13.352 and 20.449 if he 
chooses to not upgrade or upgrade respectively.   
 Lastly, it should be stressed that the foresighted consumers can attain a higher utility 
as long as they hold perfect information.  With no risk of uncertain information regarding the 
new device in the second (or future) periods, the consumer can act in full confidence that 
under this set of parameters, he will be indifferent to the product introduction in period 2.  
However, even though the illustration suggests the foresighted consumer can achieve higher 
utility than the myopic consumers, the exposure to risk is higher if they were present.  For 
instance, the myopic consumer has a more balance utility schedule than the foresighted 
consumers.  If the consumers choose to stay with their current device, the utility in each 
period are 1.4197 and 4.7323 for the myopic consumer and -9.54 and 23.849 for the 
foresighted consumer.  Relatively speaking, during period 1, the foresighted consumer 
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experiences a large disutility from his choice.  Thus, with uncertainty present in the 
environment, it is not difficult to assume consumers may vary their level of exposure (in 
terms of disutility) depending on the quality of the information they can gather about the new 
device.  The next section will discuss the consumer decisions under uncertainty. 
Observations from the Numerical Illustration From the given set of parameters, some 
general observances can be made of the consumer behaviours: 
 With the relative utility (i.e. Wm = Wn = 3), the consumers with low values of θ would 
be most adverse to upgrading.  The consumers who possess low values of θ require the 
highest net utility of the new product to be indifferent. 
 Larger values of Wm and Wn would lead to a market where consumers with high 
preferences face more barriers to upgrade.  Since the low values of preferences make 
those consumers less sensitive towards app quality, the consumers who require a higher 
net utility are now individuals with higher values of preferences. 
 In general, the utility of m components have a greater effect on Vu than the yield from n 
components.  Figure 12b on the right possesses values of Wm = 6 and Wn = 3.  
Intuitively, this is justified since the decision to upgrade hinges upon the comparison 
between using m components for one or two periods.  The effect of the n components is 
less prominent since it is dampened by the coefficient c of the penalty factor.  Figure 12a 
on the left possesses values of Wm = 3 and Wn = 6.  As the utility of hardware 
components increases, the consumer requires a higher net utility of the new device to 
remain indifferent.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
 





Figure 2: Number of Applications from June 2009 to November 2011 for each Storefront (148Apps.biz, AppBrain.com, 
Androlib.com, Distimo Monthly reports) 
 
 



































Figure 5: Model – Device Introduction Assumptions: Product Introduction Cycle and Quality Improvements 
  
Note that at 0, Android and Apple introduce a device with the same level of 
quality whereby consumers are indifferent between the two.  At 1, Android 
introduces a new device with improvement Δ while Apple maintains the same 
device.  At 2, both firms will produce a new device but Apple will present a larger 
improvement making the quality of the competing devices equivalent.  In general, 
it is assumed that Android has a shorter product introduction cycle than Apple but 









Figure 7: Non-Binding and Penalty-Binding Cases with Respect to Wm (Where θ = γ = 0.9) 
 
 













Figure 8: Non-Binding and Penalty-Binding Cases with Respect to Wm (Where θ = γ = 0.1) 
 
Figure 9: Demand of m under the Non-Binding Penalty Behaviour with respect to Utility 
 
 
















Figure 11: Net Utility of New Product where Consumers are Indifferent; (a) Left – Wm = Wn = 3 (b) Right – Wm = Wn = 5 
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Figure 12: Net Utility of New Product where Consumers are Indifferent; (a) Left – Wm = 3, Wn =6 (b) Right – Wm = 6, Wn = 3 






















  Approx. Number of Apps Approx. Number of 
Downloads 
Apple App Store 510,412 15 billion 
Android Market Place 330,845 4.5 billion 
BlackBerry App World 50,015 1 billion 
Windows Marketplace 40,000 N/A 
Table 1: Cumulative Download across Application Storefronts as of November 2011 
 
 Apple figures are from http://148apps.biz/app-store-metrics/?mpage 
 Android figures are from http://www.appbrain.com/stats/number-of-android-apps 
 BlackBerry App World are from the RIM website 




“Android Fragmentation Visualized: The Many Faces of a Little Green Robot.” In 
OpenSignalMaps. n.d. from http://opensignalmaps.com/reports/fragmentation.php 
retrieved August 21, 2012 
 “Android vs. iPhone: Battle of the Mobile Operating Systems.” In Hunch. August 25, 2011. 
from http://blog.hunch.com/?p=51781 retrieved August 25, 2011 
“Appcelerator Q2 Mobile Developer Survey Report 2012.” In Appcelerator. n.d. from 
http://www.appcelerator.com/form/forms/www/survey-2012-q2-download retrieved July 
21, 2012 
“Appcelerator Q2 Mobile Developer Survey Report 2011.” In Appcelerator. n.d. from 
http://www.appcelerator.com/form/forms/www/survey-2011-q2-download retrieved July 
21, 2012 
“App Store Metrics.” In 148Apps.biz. September 2012. from http://148apps.biz/app-store-
metrics/?mpage retrieved Various Dates 
 “Application Statistics.” In MobileWalla. n.d. from 
http://www.mobilewalla.com/Desktop/AppIntel_AppCount.htm?filterDevicePlatform=10
1 retrieved Various Dates 
“Blue Ocean Strategic Moves – iTunes.” In Blue Ocean Strategy. n.d. from 
http://www.blueoceanstrategy.com/abo/itunes.html retrieved July 21, 2012 
“Clash of Ecosystems.” In VisionMobile. November 2011. from 
http://www.visionmobile.com/product/clash-of-ecosystems/ retrieved July 21, 2012 
“CyanogenMod Device.” In CyanogenMod. n.d. from http://www.cyanogenmod.com/devices 
retrieved August 1, 2012 
“Definition of Digital Content.” In PCMag. n.d. from 
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,1237,t=digital+content&i=41313,00.asp 
retrieved July 21, 2012 
“Definition of PDA.” In PCMag. n.d. from 
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0%2C1237%2Ct%3DPDA&i%3D49021%2
C00.asp retrieved July 21, 2012 
 
 88 
“Definition of Smartphone.” In PCMag. n.d. from 
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=Smartphone&i=51537,00.asp 
retrieved July 21, 2012 
“iPod History – The Complete History of the iPod.” In iPod History. n.d. from 
www.ipodhistory.com retrieved May 4, 2011 
“Mobile Megatrends 2012.” In VisionMobile. May 2012. from 
http://www.visionmobile.com/product/mobile-megatrends/ retrieved July 21, 2012 
“Open Governance Index.” In VisionMobile. July 2011. from 
http://www.visionmobile.com/product/open-governance-index/ retrieved July 21, 2012 
“Robust Growth in Smartphone Sales Drives the Global Mobile Phone Accessories Market, 
According to New Report by Global Industry Analysts, Inc.” In PRWeb. July 26, 2012. 
from 
http://www.prweb.com/releases/mobile_phone_accessories/chargers_headsets_USB/prwe
b9737241.htm Retrieved July 31, 2012, 
“The Evolution of Cell Phone Design Between 1983-2009.” In WebdesignerDepot. n.d. from 
http://www.webdesignerdepot.com/2009/05/the-evolution-of-cell-phone-design-between-
1983-2009/ retrieved May 1, 2011 
“The History of Online Shopping in Nutshell.” In instantShift. March 26, 2010. from 
http://www.instantshift.com/2010/03/26/the-history-of-online-shopping-in-nutshell/ 
retrieved May 1, 2011 
“Top 8 Mobile Operating Systems from Sep 2012 to Sep 2011.” In StatCounter GlobalStats. 
September 2012. from http://gs.statcounter.com/#mobile_os-ww-monthly-201009-
201109 retrieved from September 30, 2011 
“Total Installs.” In CyanogenMod. September 2012. from http://stats.cyanogenmod.com/ 
retrieved August 1, 2012 
“U.S. Smartphone Penetration.” In comScore Data Mine. September 16, 2012. from 
http://www.comscoredatamine.com/2010/09/u-smartphone-penetration/ retrieved July 21, 
2012 
Android Market Statistics. In AppBrain. n.d. from http://www.appbrain.com/stats/android-
market-app-categories retrieved Various Dates 
 
 89 
Bayus, B. (1991) “The Consumer Durable Replacement Buyer,” Journal of Market, Vol. 55, 
Issue 1, pp. 42-51 
Blodget, Henry. “Attention Apple Fans: Samsung Blowing Past Apple to Become the 
Biggest Smartphone Vendor is Not Good News.” In Business Insider. October 29, 2011. 
from http://www.businessinsider.com/samsung-apple-smartphone-market-share-2011-10 
Retrieved November 21, 2011, 
Borenstein, S., MacKie-Mason, J., Netz, J. (2000), “Exercising Market Power in Proprietary 
Aftermarkets,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 9, Issue 2, pp. 157-
188 
Caminal, R.,  Matutues, C. (1990), “Endogenous Switching Costs in a Duopoly Model,” 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol 8, Issue 3, pp. 353-373 
Chen, R. (1997), “Paying Customers to Switch,” Journal of Economics and Management 
Strategy, Vol 4, No. 4, pp. 877-897 
Choi, J. (1994), “Network Externality, Compatibility Choice, and Planned Obsolescence,” 
The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 167-182 
Christensen, C. M. (1997), “The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause 
Great Firms to Fail,” Boston: Harvard Business School Press 
Church, J., Gandal, N. (1992) “Integration, Complementary Products, and Variety,” Journal 
of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 1, Issue 4, pp. 651-675 
Church, J., Gandal, N. (1993), “Complementary Network Externalities and Technological 
Adoption,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol 11, pp. 239-260 
Cooper, T. (2004) “Inadequate Life? Evidence of Consumer Attitude to Product 
Obsolescence,” Journal of Consumer Policy, Vol. 27, pp.421-449 
David, Paul (1985), "Clio and the economics of QWERTY." American Economic Review, 
75(2), 332-337. 
Doganoglu, T. (2010) “Switching Costs, Experience Goods and Dynamic Price 
Competition,” Quantitative Marketing and Economics, Vol. 8, Issue 2, pp. 167-205 
Economides, Nicholas. (1996) “The Economics of Networks,” International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, Vol. 14, pp. 673-699 
 
 90 
Farrell, J., Saloner, G. (1986) “Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product 
Preannouncements, and Predation,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 76, No. 5, pp. 
940-955 
Farrell, J., Shapiro, C. (1988) “Dynamic Competition with Switching Costs,” The RAND 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 123-137 
Foray, Dominique. (1997) “The Dynamic Implications of Increasing Returns: Technological 
Change and Path Dependent Inefficiencies,” International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, Vol. 15, pp. 733-752 
Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J. (1984) “The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and 
Hungry Look,” American Economic Review, Vol 74, Issue 2, pp. 361-366 
Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J. (2000), “Customer Poaching and Brand Switching,” The RAND 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 634-657 
Gordon, Brett R. (2009), “A Dynamic Model of Consumer Replacement Cycles in the PC 
Processor Industry,” Marketing Science, Vol. 28, No. 5, pp. 846-867, 2009. 
Guiltinan, J. (2010), “Consumer Durable Replacement Decision-Making: An Overview and 
Research Agenda,” Market Letters, Volume 2, pp.163-174 
Halevy, Ronen. “The History of RIM & the BlackBerry Smartphone, Part 1: The Origins.” In 
BerryReview. February 12, 2009. from http://www.berryreview.com/2009/02/12/the-
history-of-rim-the-blackberry-smartphone-part-1-the-origins/ retrieved November 3, 
2011 
Harris, David. (2003). “Systems Analysis and Design for the Small Enterprise,” Boston: 
Thomson 
Hartman, Joseph. (2001) “An Economics Replacement Model with Probabilistic Asset 
Utilization,” Vol. 33, Number 9, pp. 717-727 
Haucap, J., (2003) “Endogenous Switching Costs and Exclusive Systems Applications,” 
Review of Network Economics, Vol. 2, Issue 1, pp. 29-35 
Hughes, Neil. “Apple’s iPhone has 89% Retention Rate, Next Nearest Hardware is HTC at 
39%.” In Apple Insider. September 22, 2011. from 
http://www.appleinsider.com/articles/11/09/22/apples_iphone_has_89_retention_rate_ne
xt_nearest_hardware_is_htc_at_39.html Retrieved December 5, 2011 
 
 91 
Jones, William. (2008) “Personal Information Management,” Annual Review of Information 
Science and Technology, Vol. 41, Issue 1, pp. 453-504 
Katz, M., Shapiro, C. (1996) “Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network 
Externalities,” Journal of Political Economics, Vol 94, No. 4, pp. 822-841 
Kim, Ryan. “Android Market Driven by Prolific, Active Devs.” In Gigaom. August 11, 2011. 
from http://gigaom.com/2011/08/11/android-market-driven-by-prolific-active-devs/ 
retrieved January 12, 2012 
Kim, Ryan. “Android Users Only Spend Time on Top Apps.” In Gigaom. August 18,2011. 
from  http://gigaom.com/2011/08/18/android-users-only-spend-time-on-top-apps/ 
retrieved January 12, 2012 
Klemperer, P. (1987a) “Markets with Consumer Switching Costs,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol 102, pp. 375-394 
Klemperer, P. (1987b) “The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs,” The RAND 
Journal of Economics, Vol 18, No 1, pp. 138-150 
Klemperer, P. (1995) “Competition when Consumers have Switching Costs: An Overview 
with Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and International Trade”, 
The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 62, No. 4, pp. 515-539 
Malik, Om. “How Big is the Apple iPhone App Economy?  The Answer might Surprise 
you.” In Gigaom. August 27, 2009. from http://gigaom.com/2009/08/27/how-big-is-
apple-iphone-app-economy-the-answer-might-surprise-you/ retrieved July 21, 2012 
Marinoso, B. (2001) “Technological Incompatibility, Endogenous Switching Costs and 
Lock-In,” The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 69, No. 3, pp. 281-298 
McInnes, Kyle. “A Review of App World in 2010 Shows Little Actual App Growth.” In 
BlackBerryCool. January 10, 2011. from http://www.blackberrycool.com/2011/01/10/a-
review-of-app-world-in-2010-shows-little-actual-app-growth/ retrieved July 21, 2012 
Miao, C. (2010), “Consumer Myopia, Standardization and Aftermarket Monopolization,” 
European Economic Review, Volume 54, pp. 931-946 
Okada, Erica Mina. (2006) “Upgrades and New Purchases,” Journal of Marketing, Vol. 70, 
No. 4, pp. 92-102 
 
 92 
Purcell, Kristen, Entner, Roger, Henderson, Nichole. “The Rise of Apps Culture.” In Pew 
Internet. September 14, 2010. from http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/The-Rise-of-
Apps-Culture.aspx retrieved May 5, 2011 
Rose, Brent. “Geek 101: Demystifying Custom Android ROMs (Part I).” In PCWorld. 
February 7, 2011. from 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/218898/geek_101_demystifying_custom_android_roms_
part_i.html retrieved August 1, 2012 
Rose, Brent. “Rooting your Android Phone: FAQ.” In PCWorld. December 23, 2010. from 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/214697/rooting_your_android_phone_faq.html retrieved 
August 1, 2012 
Rysman, Marc. (2009) “The Economics of Two-Sided Markets,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 23, Number 3, pp. 125-143 
Sadewo, Carns. “Flipboard Available Exclusively on Samsung Galaxy S3, other Android 
devices to follow soon.” In Android Authority. May 7, 2012. from 
http://www.androidauthority.com/flipboard-android-samsung-galaxy-s3-82751/ retrieved 
July 21, 2012 
Schonfeld, Erick. “Android and iPhone Apps Cost About the Same, Except for Games and 
Dictionaries.” In Tech Crunch. August 6, 2009 from 
http://techcrunch.com/2009/08/06/android-and-iphone-apps-cost-about-the-same-except-
for-games-and-dictionaries/ retrieved July 21, 2012 
Shapiro, C., Teece, D. (1994), “Systems Competition and Aftermarkets: An Economic 
Analysis of Kodak,” Antitrust Bulletin, Vol 39, pp. 135-162 
Stango, Victor (2004) "The Economics of Standards Wars," Review of Network Economics: 
Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 1. 
Statistics. In Androlib. September 2012. from http://www.androlib.com/appstats.aspx 
retrieved Various Dates 
Various Monthly Reports. In Distimo. various dates. from 
http://www.distimo.com/publications/ retrieved various dates 
Various Reports. In Nielsen Wire. various dates. from 
http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online_mobile/ retrieved various dates 
 
 93 
Viecens, Maria Fernanda. (2011) “Compatibility with Firm Dominance,” Review of Network 
Economics, Vol. 10, Issue 4, pp. 1262 
von Weizsäcker, C. (1984), “The Cost of Substitution,” Econometrica, Vol 52, No. 5, pp. 
1085-1116 
Wang, H. (2002) “A Survey of Maintenance Policies of Deteriorating Systems,” European 
Journal of Operational Research, Vol 139, Issues 3, pp. 469-489 
Wauters, Robin. “iPhone Users Share Download Behavior with Android Users, but Buy 
More Apps.” In Tech Crunch. August 27, 2009. from 
http://techcrunch.com/2009/08/27/iphone-users-share-download-behavior-with-android-
users-but-buy-more-apps/ retrieved August 23, 2011 
Xue, L., Ray, G., Whinston, A. (2006), “Strategic Investment in Switching Cost: An 
Integrated Customer Acquisition and Retention Perspective,” International Journal of 
Electronic Commerce, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 7-35 
Yardley, Greg. “AppStore Secrets.” In Pinch Media. February 18, 2009. from 
http://www.slideshare.net/pinchmedia/iphone-appstore-secrets-pinch-media retrieved 
August 3, 2011 
 
 
